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Abstract
These four essays concern the theory of games and its application to economic theory. The
first two, closely linked, chapters are an investigation into the foundational question of the
sensitivity of the predictions of game theory to higher-order beliefs.
Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty
with Muhamet Yildiz
In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present
economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common knowledge of the type
structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal-form
games in which the players' strategy spaces are compact metric spaces, we show that our key
condition, called "global stability under uncertainty," implies a variety of results to the effect
that the impact of higher-order uncertainty is small. Our central result states that, under global
stability, the maximum change in equilibrium strategies due to changes in players' beliefs at
orders higher than k is exponentially decreasing in k. Therefore, given any need for precision,
we can approximate equilibrium strategies by specifying only finitely many orders of beliefs.
Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium
with Muhamet Yildiz
Present economic theories make a common-knowledge assumption that implies that the first
or second-order beliefs determine all higher-order beliefs. We analyze the role of such a closing
assumption at any finite order by instead allowing higher orders to vary arbitrarily. Assuming
that the space of underlying uncertainty is sufficiently rich, we show that, under an arbitrary
fixed equilibrium, the resulting set of possible outcomes must include all outcomes that survive
iterated elimination of strategies that are never a strict best reply. For many games, this
implies that, unless the game is dominance-solvable, every equilibrium will be highly sensitive
to higher-order beliefs, and thus economic theories based on such equilibria may be misleading.
Moreover, every equilibrium is discontinuous at each type for which two or more actions survive
our elimination process. Conversely, the resulting set of possible outcomes must be contained
in rationalizable strategy profiles. This yields a precise characterization in generic instances.
Price Dispersion and Loss Leaders
Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price
competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost.
One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a firm
prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher customer volume for profitable goods.
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By assuming high transportation costs which indeed force each consumer to buy all desired
goods at a single firm, we create the possibility of an effective loss-leader strategy. We find,
however, that such a strategy cannot be effective in equilibrium, so that additional assumptions
limiting price search or rationality must be introduced to explain price dispersion or loss leaders.
Two Notes on the Blotto Game
We exhibit a new equilibrium of the classic Blotto game in which players allocate one unit
of resources among three coordinates and try to defeat their opponent in two out of three. It
is well known that a mixed strategy will be an equilibrium strategy if the marginal distribution
on each coordinate is U [0, 2]. All known examples of such distributions have two-dimensional
support. Here we exhibit a distribution which has one-dimensional support and is simpler
to describe than previous examples. The construction generalizes to give one-dimensional
distributions with the same property in higher-dimensional simplexes as well.
As our second note, we give some results on the equilibrium payoffs when the game is
modified so that one player has greater available resources. Our results suggest a criterion for
equilibrium selection in the original symmetric game, in terms of robustness with respect to a
small asymmetry in resources.
Thesis Supervisor: Muhamet Yildiz
Title: Assistant Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Glenn D. Ellison
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
Most economic theories are based on equilibrium analysis of models in which the players' types
(following Harsanyi (1967)) are simply taken as their beliefs about some underlying uncertainty,
such as the marginal cost of a firm or the value of an object for a buyer, and rarely include
a player's beliefs about the other players' beliefs about the underlying uncertainty. Using
such a type structure implicitly assumes that, conditional on the first-order beliefs about some
payoff-relevant uncertainty, all of a player's higher-order beliefs are common knowledge. Even
the literature on global games (Carlsson and van Damme (1993)) and on forecasting others'
forecasts (Townsend (1983)) makes this assumption (in a finite-dimensional space of payoff
uncertainty.) 2
There is now an extensive literature, however, that emphasizes that in some games higher-
order uncertainty has as large an impact on equilibrium behavior as lower-order uncertainty
(see Rubinstein (1989), Kajii and Morris (1998) and Morris (2002)). As Rubinstein (1989) illus-
trates, the equilibria of a game in which a particular piece of information is common knowledge
can be profoundly different from the equilibria of games in which this information is mutually
1Here we use the standard terminology: a player's first-order beliefs are his beliefs about the underlying
uncertainty; his second-order beliefs are roughly his beliefs about the other players' first-order beliefs, and so on.
2For an illustration of how a model with such an assumption can be deceptive regarding the impact of
higher-order uncertainty, see Section 1.2.3.
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known only up to some finite order - no matter how many orders we consider. Most impor-
tantly, when the higher-order beliefs have large impact, the present economic theories may be
misleading. 3 This large impact is also disturbing because it is hard to believe that we would ever
know a player's high-order beliefs with any precision. Without such knowledge, we cannot make
accurate predictions when the impact of higher-order uncertainty is large. Moreover, assum-
ing that higher-order beliefs correspond to higher-order reasoning, such a large impact implies
that the bounds of rationality are at least as important as the basic incentives. This would
necessitate a change of paradigm for analyzing these problems. Therefore, it is of fundamental
importance to classify games in which high-order uncertainty has little impact.
In this paper, we provide a set of sufficient conditions under which high-order uncertainty
has little impact. Our main sufficient condition is called "global stability under uncertainty."
It states that the variation in each player's best response is always less than the variation in his
beliefs about the others' actions (according to the embedding metric defined later), multiplied
by a constant b that is less than 1. Under certain continuity assumptions, we show that
global stability under uncertainty is closely related to the standard concept of global stability
of best-response correspondence (under certainty). For games with one-dimensional strategy
spaces, we further provide a simple second-order condition that guarantees global stability under
uncertainty.
We consider finite-person games in which the strategy spaces are compact metric spaces and
there is some payoff-relevant source of uncertainty that comes from a complete, separable metric
space. We work in universal type space, where the players' types are their entire hierarchy of
beliefs about the underlying uncertainty, allowing players to entertain any coherent set of beliefs.
We show that, when the best responses are always unique, global stability implies that our
game is dominance-solvable. This may suggest that our condition is too strong. Nevertheless,
we illustrate somewhere else (Weinstein and Yildiz (2004)) that, when the best responses are
always unique, dominance solvability is a necessary condition for diminishing effect of higher-
order beliefs. We will refer to equilibrium throughout the paper because our results also apply
to games without unique best responses, which might not be dominance-solvable.
3 For example. the Coase conjecture may fail when we introduce second-order uncertainty as shown by Feinberg
and Skrzypacz (2002).
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We fix a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of this game. Note that, since every type space can be
embedded in universal type space, this corresponds to fixing an equilibrium for all type spaces
simultaneously. Let us also fix a player's beliefs up to a certain order k. Our main result states
that, assuming global stability, the maximum variation in the player's equilibrium strategy, as
we vary all his higher-order beliefs, is at most bk times a constant. That means that, if we want
to determine the equilibrium behavior within a certain margin of error (e.g., in order to check
the validity of a certain theoretical prediction), we only need to specify finitely many orders of
beliefs, where the required number of orders k* is a logarithmic function of the desired precision.
In particular, the impact of an erroneous common knowledge assumption at orders higher than
k* will be less than the specified bound. This is a contribution to the goal set out by Wilson
(1987) of "successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful
analyses of practical problems."
We have so far focused on the maximum change in a player's equilibrium strategy due to any
change in his higher-order beliefs. We also investigate the relationship of the change in strategy
to the size of the change in beliefs. Towards this goal, firstly, we define an "embedding metric"
on beliefs at each order (as well as on beliefs about the other players' actions). This metric has
the crucial property of preserving the distances in lower-order beliefs when they are embedded
in the space of higher-order beliefs as point masses, allowing us to sensibly compare variations at
different orders. We ask how much a player's strategy varies as we vary his belief at some order
k and keep all his other beliefs fixed. (To be able to do this without violating the coherency
of his beliefs, we need an independence assumption about the different orders of beliefs, an
assumption that is satisfied in traditional "independent private value" environments.) Now we
can define the! marginal impact of a change in kth-order beliefs as the variation in equilibrium
strategies divided by the size of this change in beliefs as measured by our embedding metric.
We show that, under global stability and the independence assumption, the marginal impact
of changes in kth-order beliefs is at most bk times a constant. This formalizes our notion that,
under global stability, the marginal impact of higher-order beliefs decreases exponentially. In
that case, precision in lower-order beliefs will be much more important than the precision in
higher-order beliefs in approximating a problem. It also follows that the players' equilibrium
behavior would not change much if they formed erroneous higher-order beliefs. These assertions
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may all sound very natural; we should emphasize that they may easily fail when global stability
does not hold. In particular, with linear best-responses, the marginal impact of kth-order beliefs
actually increases exponentially in k whenever global stability does not hold.
Assuming that best responses are always unique, one can show that global stability implies
the contraction property of Nyarko (1997), who investigates the convergence to equilibrium in
a general abstract model in the same vein as Townsend (1983). Under his contraction property,
Nyarko (1997) shows that the unique equilibrium must be continuous with respect to the usual
product topology on universal type space. Using this, one can further show that the maximum
and the marginal impact of higher-order beliefs must eventually vanish as we consider higher
and higher order beliefs. This does not, however, tell us how fast these impacts are diminishing
or whether they diminish monotonically. Most importantly, Nyarko's fixed-point argument
would not tell us why higher-order beliefs must be less important under global stability and
how this may be reversed if global stability fails. Our constructive proof with explicit bounds
sheds light on these issues. Moreover, the framework we develop remains useful even when
global stability fails.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we illustrate the relation between
stability and dampening impact of higher-order beliefs using games with linear best responses.
In Section 1.7, we present our basic model with independence assumption and introduce the
embedding metric; we introduce global stability in Section 1.4 and provide sufficient conditions
and examples for it in Section 1.5. Our major results are presented in Section 2.3 with in-
dependence assumption, and our main result is extended beyond this assumption in Section
1.3. Section 2.9 reviews the relevant literature, and Section 2.10 concludes. Some proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Examples with Linear Best Responses
We will now show how dampening impact of higher-order uncertainty is equivalent to stability in
games with linear best-response functions, such as the linear Cournot duopoly. This illustrates
the close relationship between these two concepts which we will establish in a broader context
in the later sections.
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1.2.1 Cournot Duopoly
Consider a Cournot duopoly where the inverse-demand function is given by
P=8-Q
where P is the price of a good and Q = q + q2 where qi is the supply of firm i E N = {1, 2}
and 0 is an unknown demand parameter. The costs are zero, so that the payoff function of firm
i is
ui (ql, q2) = qi ( - ql - q2) 
Everything other than 0 is common knowledge.
We do not make any informational assumption about 0; we want to allow variations in all lev-
els of uncertainty. (See Subsection 1.2.3 for a traditional model of incomplete information-with
strong informational assumptions.) Firm i has a probability distribution t on  representing
its beliefs about 0. Firm j has also a probability distribution t2 on tl representing j's beliefs
about i's beliefs about 0. In general, firm i has probability distribution t on t- 1, representing
kth-order beliefs of firm i. Firm i's type is the entire list t = (ti, t2,.).
A strategy profile (q*, q*), where q* : ti - qi*(ti) specifies firm i's supply as a function of its
type, is an equilibrium iff qi*(ti) maximizes the expected payoff of type t given the strategy qj*
of the other firm. That is, equilibrium strategy q will maximize the expected payoff
Ei [qi ( - q - q (tj))] = q ( - qi - Ei [qj (tj)]),
where expectation Ei will be determined by its beliefs (ti, t2,...) at all levels, as qj* (tj) depends
on the entire type tj. This implies that
qi = 2 - Ei [qj (tj)] (1.1)
Of course, we also have
qj = Ej [] - Ej [qi (ti) (1.2)
2 2
12
Substituting (1.2) in (1.1), we can obtain
* Ei [0] EiEj [] + EiEj [q] (1.3)
2 4 4
A further substitution of (1.1) in (1.3) would yield
Ei [0] EiEj [0] EiEjEi [ ] 1
2 4 + 8 8
Here Ei [0] depends only on ti, the beliefs of i about the demand, EiEj [0] depends only on t2
the beliefs of i about the beliefs of j about the demand, and EiEjEi [q] depends on the third
and all higher-order beliefs. In general,
* Ei [] EiEj [] + EiEEi [] 1 *
qi = 2 4 8 - + EiEjEi Ei [qj]2 - 4 8 v3
k times
when k is odd; the last term is EiEjEi ... Ej[qi*]/2k when k is even. In equilibrium, each firm's
supply will always be in [0, 1]; hence the absolute value of the last term is at most 1/2k . That
is, if we fix the beliefs up to kth order, we know the equilibrium strategy q* up to an error of
at most 1/2 k
This also implies that we can write the equilibrium strategy as a convergent series
[0] _ EiEjEi [0] E iEjEj [0] EEE + ...
qi -+ 3 32 4 8 16
where the coefficient of the kth term is 1/2 k. The significance of this formula is that the
coefficients of expectations decrease exponentially as we go to higher-order expectations.
1.2.2 General Case with Linear Best Responses
The analysis above can be easily generalized to the case with linear best-response functions
BRi = Ei [ + baj]
13
where 0 is the underlying parameter and aj is the (unknown) action of player j. A strategy of
a player is a function s* that determines which action i takes as a function of his hierarchy of
beliefs. Now, the equilibrium strategies satisfy
= Ei [] bEEj [] + b2 [] + 2EiEjEi  bkEiEjEi Ei [s] (1.4)
k times
when k is odd. The absolute value of the coefficients will decrease exponentially, resulting in a
convergent infinite series as above, if and only if Ibl < 1.
* This corresponds precisely to the stability of the equilibrium of the complete information
game under the best-response correspondence. (See Footnote 5.)
* When the equilibrium is unstable, the impact of higher-order beliefs in equilibrium is
actually higher than that of lower-order beliefs, and one must know the higher-order
beliefs to an increasingly high level of precision in order to predict behavior.
* Our derivation in this section relies only on the formation of higher-order expectations-
not on the particular type space used. Hence it applies to any type structure.
* We are only able to use the substitution trick here to derive a simple formula because of
the linearity of the best-response function. In the general case a player's best response
depends on the details of the entire distribution (as noted by Morris (2002)) and there is
no direct relationship between a player's best responses under certainty and uncertainty,
rendering such elementary analysis impossible and requiring the more sophisticated tools
of the following sections.
Note also that Morris and Shin (2003) and Morris (2002) obtain specific examples with
linear best responses similar to ours in this section.
1.2.3 A Traditional Type Structure
We have ex ante 0 N (0, 1), and each player i gets a private signal xi = 0 + i where
Ei N (0, (1- v) /v) for some v E (0, 1) and 0, e1, and 62 are all independent. For each i,
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assume BR = E [0 + bajlxi] for some b > O, where E [0lxi] = vxi. The above is all common
knowledge.
Check that, whenever bvy 1, we have a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s* with
vxi
si --bv' (1.5)
= 1- bv
When b < 1, equilibrium seems intuitive. When b > 1, however, counterintuitively the
coefficient of xi is negative and hence s* is decreasing in xi. Now, write s as a series of higher
order expectation as in (1.4). Since the kth-order expectation of 0 is EiEjEi... Ej [0] = vkxi,
we have
= vxi + bv2xi + b 2V3X +... + bkEEjE .. E,
k times
Firstly, notice that when bv > 1, higher-order terms increase exponentially, yielding a divergent
series. This explosively large impact of higher-order uncertainty, however, does not appear in
the directly computed formula in (1.5). Second, when b < 1 < b, we have a convergent series
yielding seemingly intuitive formula in (1.5), despite the fact that marginal contributions of
higher-order expectations increase exponentially. This is only because our single-dimensional
type space forced the variations in higher-order expectations to decrease exponentially,4 com-
pensating the increases in marginal contributions. But in the approximated real-life situation,
the players will probably have higher-order doubts about this model. In that case, their higher-
order expectations may vary significantly, leading to dramatically different behavior (under the
equilibrium of more accurate model). In that case, the model's predictions about the behavior
will be misleading, and considerations about higher-order beliefs within the model will yield a
false sense of robustness.
1.3 Model
We consider a game among players N = {1, 2, ... , n}. The source of underlying uncertainty is
a payoff-relevant parameter 0 E O where (, d) is a compact Polish space (i.e., a complete and
separable metric space), where d is a metric on set e. Each player i has action space Ai, which
4This is a general phenomenon (see Samet (1998).)
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is a compact metric space, and utility function ui : E x A R IR where A = i Ai.
Notation. Given any list X1,..., X, of sets, write X-i = 1jfi Xj, xi = (xl,..., i-l,i+l, . . , x) E
X-i, and (xi,x-i) = (Xl,..., Xi_li, xXi+l,...,Xn). Likewise, for any family of functions
fj : Xj - , j C N, we define f-i X-i - Y-i by f-i (x-i) = (fj (xj))ji. Given any
metric space (X, d), write A(X) for the space of probability distributions on X, suppressing
the fixed a-algebra on X which at least contains all open sets; when we use product spaces, we
will always use the product r-algebra. We write di for the metric on Ai for each i E N and
define the metric di on A-i by
d-i (a-i, a_ i) = max dj (aj, a) .ib
We now define the players' hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying parameter 0, using the
usual construction of the universal type space by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), a variant
of an earlier construction by Mertens and Zamir (1985). We will define our types using the
auxiliary sequence {Xk} of sets defined inductively by Xo = E and Xk = [A (Xk_)] x Xk_ 1
for each k > 0. We endow each Xk with the weak topology and the u-algebra generated by this
topology, yielding a standard separable Borel space as is a Polish space. A player i's first
order beliefs are represented by a probability distribution T on Xo, second order beliefs (about
all players' first order beliefs and the underlying uncertainty) are represented by a probability
distribution 7- on X1, etc. Therefore, a type
Ti = (TI, T i7,. . )
of a player i is a member of II=l A (Xk-l). Since a player's kth-order beliefs contain infor-
mation about his lower order beliefs, we need the usual coherence requirements. We write T
for the subset of (ll 1= A (Xkl)) n in which it is common knowledge that the players' beliefs
are coherent, i.e., the players know their own beliefs and their marginals from different orders
agree. We will use the variables , E T as generic type profiles. The beliefs of any type Ti
about (0, Ti) are represented by some probability distribution rTi c A ( x _i).
A strategy of a player i is a measurable mapping si : Ti - Ai, that determines which
action s (ri) he would choose given his type i. We fix a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s* =
16
(st, st,. ., s, which must be such that s (Ti) maximizes the expected value E [ui (, ai, s* i (i)) Ti]
of ui (0, ai, s*.i (--i)) with respect to nK~ at each Ti and for each i. Global stability implies ex-
istence and uniqueness of equilibrium for games with unique best responses.
1.4 Stability, Rationalizability, and Higher-order Uncertainty
We are now ready to present our sufficient condition for the dampening impact of higher order
uncertainty: stability of equilibrium under the best-response function. The global stability of
equilibrium is usually defined by the condition that the variation in the best response is less
than the variation in the other players' strategies under certainty.5 We will first extend this
notion to the best response function under uncertainty, which is not directly related to the best
response function under certainty.
Best Responses Given any player i and any probability distribution 7r on E x A_i, we write
BR (r) for the best response of player i when his beliefs about the underlying uncertainty 0
and the other players' actions a_i are represented by 7r. Notice that we are taking the best
response to be a function rather than a correspondence. Under certain conditions (e.g., when
the strategy spaces are convex and utilities are strictly quasi-concave in own strategy), the best-
response correspondence will indeed be singleton. In general, however, there may be multiple
best responses. In those cases we will assume that the equilibrium uses a singleton selection from
the best-response correspondence. In the former case, the global stability defined below will be
a property of the game, while in the latter case, it will be a property of the equilibrium. Under
the independence assumption, we will have 7r = tI x , for some t1 E A () and /u E A (Ai). In
that case, we will write BR, (ti, /) instead of BRI (r). When it does not lead to any confusion,
we will sometimes suppress some of the arguments (e.g., write BR (u) when t is fixed) or
write it in the form of BRi (0, a_i; ti), denoting the best response of player i when his type is
ti, where 0 and a_i are random variables.
5The usual definition appears to be different. For instance, in two player games we only need that the
product of maximum variations is less than 1. Of course, under this condition, we could rescale our metrics on
each strategy space so that our definition is also satisfied.
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Global stability under uncertainty We say that global stability under uncertainty holds
iff there exists some b E [0, 1) such that, given any i E N and any 7r, 7r' E A ( x Ai) with
marger = margeir', we have
di (BR (r) , BR, (r')) < b i (, r'), (1.6)
where
d_i(7r, Tr') inf di (ai, a' i) dv(O, ai, a i) (1.7)
and
Xi,,, = {v E A(E x Ai x A_i): marg 12v = 7r, marg 13v = 7r'}. (1.8)
The required condition for global stability is the standard condition for Lipschitz continuity
(of each BR; with respect to the metric d_i on A ( x A_i)) with the additional requirement
that the constant b, which can be thought of as an upper bound on the absolute value of the
slope, be less than 1. Of course, this is the same as saying that for each i there is a bi E [0, 1)
satisfying the above condition, since we can take b = max {b1,..., bn}.6
Our first result states that global stability implies that our game is dominance-solvable.
Notice that in our game, a strategy of a player i is a function from his entire type space to Ai.
Proposition 1 Assume that each player has single-valued best response correspondence, and
assume global stability under uncertainty. Then, there exists unique rationalizable strategy pro-
file s*, which is the unique equilibrium.
We prove this proposition in the appendix for the general model developed in Section 1.3.
Our proof essentially shows that the diameter of the space of surviving strategies, measured as
the maximum distance among available actions to any given type of any player, decreases by a
factor of b at each round. Therefore, in the limit there can be at most one strategy profile. Since
global stability implies the contraction property of Nyarko (1997), there exists an equilibrium
s*, which will never be eliminated and hence will be the unique rationalizable strategy profile.
6 Notice that the metric di is identical to the embedding metric (defined in Section xxx) with the slight
modification that the infimum is taken only for the joint distributions on ( x A_i) 2 under which the two copies
of 0 are identical almost surely. Since we consider fewer distributions when we take the infimum, d-i is at least
as large as the usual embedding metric, and hence this modification weakens our stability condition.
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The requirement that there is always a unique best response is not superfluous. For example, for
the second-price auction with private values, there are multiple equilibria, and hence multiple
rationalizable strategies, but the dominant-strategy equilibrium is globally stable and satisfies
all of our other results.
The next result states that, under global stability, if a player i changes his beliefs about the
other players'b eliefs, then the change in equilibrium strategy of player i can be at most b times
the expected maximum change in the other players'e quilibrium strategies due to the change in
their beliefs, under the original beliefs of i.
Proposition 2 Assume global stability under uncertainty for some b E [0, 1). Consider arbi-
trary i and arbitrary measurable functions 0 : x T-i --+ x T-i and _i T-i - i with
0 (0, T-i) = (0, O-i (T-i)). Then, for any i,
di (s* (ri o 1)s (Ti)) < bE [d_i (i (Ti)), s* (T.i)) Ti]
Proof. Let 7r and 7r' be the distributions of (0, s*_i (_i)) under Ti and Ti q5- 1 , respectively.
Define the mapping a : (0, Thi ) H (0, * i (-i), s i (,-i (i))), which has distribution K,i o
Oa- 1 under Ti. Clearly, margl2 (,i oc a-1 ) = 7r and margl3 ( i o -1 ) = r', i.e., r, o a - 1 E
X,rr'- Therefore, by global stability,
di (s* (i -1) , * (Ti)) = di (BRi (r) , BR (r'))
< inf b d-i (ai, a ) dv (0, ai, ai)
L/X,rir
< b | d-i (ai, a' ) d(a i o d - 1 (0, a_i, a' i)
- bE [d_i (s*i ( , s T(_i), * (T-i))) Ti] 
Proposition 2 expresses the idea that global stability is sufficient to guarantee that the
impact of higher-order beliefs on equilibrium is diminishing. This is because when player i
changes his beliefs from ri to i o - 1 , he is changing his "higher-order" beliefs about the other
players' "lower-order" beliefs. To see this, imagine that we change the other players' kth order
beliefs and make necessary changes in their beliefs at orders k + 1 and higher according to some
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fixed theory about information structure, making sure that the beliefs remain coherent.7 This
corresponds to a transformation 0-_i that leaves the other players' k - 1st order of beliefs intact,
and the changes at orders k + 1 and higher merely reflect the change in their kth-order beliefs
according to the fixed theory. Now, player i's first k orders of beliefs are same under Ti and
Ti - 1 . Under T-i o - 1, his k + lst-order beliefs are changed to reflect his new beliefs about
the other players' kth-order beliefs; the changes in his higher-order beliefs merely reflect the
assumption that player i still believes in the fixed theory about the information structure. Our
proposition implies that, in that case, the change in equilibrium strategy of player i due to the
changes in his k + st-order beliefs can be at most b times the expected maximum change in
the other players' equilibrium strategies due to the change in their kth-order beliefs, under the
original beliefs of i.
1.5 Sufficient conditions for stability
In this section we present two sets of sufficient conditions for global stability under uncertainty.
Both sets of conditions are closely related to global stability under certainty. We first present
a general class of games where global stability under uncertainty is closely related to global
stability under certainty. This class is characterized by Assumption la.
Assumption la Best-response function of player i takes the form of
BRi (r) = fi (E [gi (0, a_i)]) (1.9)
where expectation is taken with respect to r E A ( x A_i); fi: X -+ Ai and gi: 0 x Ai - X
are two Lipschitz continuous functions defined through some Banach space (X, dx); i.e., there
exist aOi and ,3 i such that di (fi (x), fi (x')) < oidx (x, x') and dx (gi (, a_i), gi (, a' i)) 
3idi (ai, a'i.)
Note that the functional form in (1.9) is satisfied whenever ui is analytical and the optimiza-
tion problem has an interior solution. (The Taylor expansion for the first order condition would
imply such a functional form, where E [gi] is the vector of all moments.) The more substantial
7Such a theory can be a closing assumption at an order higher than k or an independence assumption.
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part of this assumption is that fi and gi are Lipschitz continuous. Under certainty, Assumption
la yields a best response function
BRi (0, a_i) = fi (gi (0, a_i)) _ hi (0, a-i) .
Our equilibrium would be stable under the best response correspondence if di (hi (0, a-i), hi (0, a'i)) •
bidi (ai, a'i) at each 0 for some bi < 1. The latter condition is slightly weaker than the fol-
lowing assumption.
Assumption lb For each i E N, we have b - ai i < 1.
Proposition 3 Assumptions la and lb imply global stability under uncertainty.
Proof. In the Appendix. 
That is, under Assumption la, global stability under uncertainty is implied by the existence
of ai's and /i's that satisfy Assumption lb. Moreover, whenever f or g is the identity, global
stability under certainty and uncertainty will be equivalent. Hence, there is a close link between
these two concepts. Although Assumption 1 might not be easy to check in general, our next
example presents a general class of games where these conditions can be easily checked.
Example 1 For each i E N, take Ai = [x, x] for some x, x E R and
ui (, ai, a-i) = di (ai) gi (9, a-i) - ci (ai),
where gi : > A-i - IR is a continuously differentiable function with lagi/aajl < i for each
j i and for some i E , and Xi and ci are twice continuously differentiable functions with
Xi > 0, ' < 0, ci > 0, and c' > O. Note that gi is Lipschitz continuous with parameter i with
respect to the changes in a-i. Check that
BRi (r) = fi (E [gi (0, a_i)])
where fi (z) is x if z < c' (x) /0' (x), x if z > c () /' (x), and it is the unique solution x to
the first order condition c' (x) /' (x) = z otherwise. By the inverse-function theorem, fi is
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also Lipschitz continuous with parameter aci = 1/ iy where yi = minxc[x,e (c' (x) /' (x))' > 0.
Therefore, global stability is satisfied whenever b - maxiGN i/?Yi < 1.
Focusing on games where the agents' strategy spaces are one-dimensional, our next result
presents a simple sufficient condition for global stability, and hence for dampening impact of
higher order uncertainty, in terms of second derivatives of the utility functions.
Proposition 4 For each i, assume Ai C IR, ui (, ) is twice-continuously differentiable, ui (, , a_i)
is strictly concave, 02ui/&ai2 is bounded away from zero, and
maxa,O 102ui (9, a) /OaiOaj 1
bi ma,02uio (0, a) /8ai2 <1. (1.10)
Then, we have global stability under uncertainty whenever (i) BRi (7r) is in the interior of Ai
for all 7r, or (ii) Ai is convex.
Proof. In the Appendix. 
1.6 Maximum Impact of Higher-order Beliefs
As argued in the Introduction, modelers would prefer not to have to specify the players' higher-
order beliefs, and the present economic theories rely on a general common knowledge assumption
for all high-order beliefs. It is then very important to determine the accuracy with which we
can predict a player's equilibrium behavior if we only know his beliefs up to kth order and have
no knowledge of his beliefs at higher orders. We are now ready to state and prove our main
result, which states that global stability implies at least a certain level of accuracy.
Proposition 5 Let Ds. = maxicN supi, ,iE di (si (Ti) ,si (T')) E R. Let also , EC T be
such that T = for all 1 < k for some k > O. Assume global stability under uncertainty for
parameter b. Then, in the general model,
di ( () , _ (Ti)) < bkDs. (1.11)
Notice that our result assumes only global stability and boundedness of the strategy space.
Under these two assumptions we reach the conclusion that, if we know the beliefs up to a certain
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order k, we can know the equilibrium play within a bound of error that is an exponentially
decreasing function of k, bounding the maximum impact all the higher-order beliefs can have
on equilibrium. Our result does not refer to any topology on the type space. Finally, Ds* is
chosen as a bound on the variations in equilibrium outcomes. If there are other known bounds
on the equilibrium outcomes, then we can replace Ds, with these bounds.
In certain cases, a modeler might want to predict the equilibrium behavior within a certain
margin of error. For example, checking the validity of certain qualitative predictions of his
theories may only require the knowledge of equilibrium strategies within a certain margin of
error. Proposition 1 tells us how many orders of uncertainty he needs to specify. It implies
that, given any e > 0 and any r G T, if we know t up to the order
log () - log (D) (1.12)> ~~lgb(1.12)
log (b)
then we can compute the equilibrium strategies up to a maximum error of e. If there is any
known bound for equilibrium action, we can replace Ds. with that bound. Notice that the
expression on the right-hand side is increasing in b and decreasing in .
In the remainder of the section we prove our proposition. We start with the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 1 Let (X, Zx), (Y, Ey), (Z, Ez) be separable standard Borel spaces, and endow X x Y,
Y x Z, X x Z, and X x Y x Z with the -algebras generated by the corresponding product
topologies. Let probability measures P and P' on X x Y and X x Z, respectively, be such that
xP =x P'. Then, there exists a probability measure P on X x Y x Z such that XXYP = P
and xxZP = P'.
Proof. In the Appendix. ·
Proof of Proposition 5. Define Q = O x 7 to be the universal state space. This is the
subset of the larger space f = E x (l= A (Xk_l)) n in which coherency is common knowledge.
By Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), fQ is a Polish space, yielding a standard separable Borel
space, and for every = (l,.... rTn) E T and for every i E N, there exists a probability
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distribution hK;i E A () such that
margxk_l ti = Ti (Vk), (1.13)
and Ti (Q) =: 1. Let
3: (0, T) ((0, s*i ( _-i)),
and write
7rri = Ki P- E ( x Ai)
for the joint distribution of the underlying uncertainty and the other players' actions induced
by ri. Notice that s (ri) = BR, (rTi).
We will use induction on k. For k = 0, this is true by definition. Fix any k > 0, and assume
that the result is true for k - 1. Take any and as in the hypothesis. We have
di (s* (Ti) ,s* (Ti)) = di (BRi (7r,i) ,BRi (7ri))
< bdi (rri, Tri )
b inf d (ai, a'i) dv(, ai, a' i) (1.14)
where the inequality is due to global stability and X, is defined by (1.8). The rest of the
proof is devoted to constructing a v E X7i, £rr- such that, under the induction hypothesis,
d-i (a _ a d i,i) a a') bk-lDs.. (1.15)
Combining (1.14) and (1.15), we obtain (1.11).
We will decompose Q as Q = x L x H where
k-1 00oo
L = H (A (X-_l))' and H = II (A (Xl))" (1.16)
1=1 I=k
are the spaces of lower and higher-order beliefs. For k = 1, we use the convention that L is a
singleton set, and 1 E L can simply be ignored in the following analysis for that case. Note that
Xk- = 3x L.
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By (2.1), we have probability distributions ,iT and rci on Q such that
k =kmargxk_rl7 i = i Ti = margxklKi,
where the second equality is by our hypothesis. Since we have separable standard Borel spaces,
by Lemma 1, there exists E A (Xk-l x H x H) such that the marginals of a on the cross
product of XAk_1 with the first and second copies of H are
marg 12cr = Kti and marg 13u = KTi,
respectively.
Now, consider v = a o y- 1 E A ( x Ai x A_i) where
"y: (, 1, hi, h2). (9, (, h), s i (1, h2)) . (1.17)
Notice that the marginal of v on the first copy of x Ai is
marg12 v = marg1 2 (ora o y-) = (marg12cr) p-1 = ri o -1 = 7ri,
and similarly marg1 3v = 7r,. Therefore, by definition, E X,ieri
We now prove (1.15). Take any (, a_i,a' i) E y (Xk-l x H x H). By (1.17), ai =
s* i (-i) and a'_i = s* i (-i) for some type profiles T = (1, hi) and = (1, h2 ), which agree up
to the order k - 1 by (1.16). Then, by the induction hypothesis,
d-i (a_i, a' _i) < bk-lD,. (1.18)
Since suppv C- y (Xk-l X H x H) (by construction), (1.18) implies (1.15). ·
1.7 Model with independence
We now define the players' hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying parameter . We confine
ourself to the belief structures where a player's beliefs are independent from his own beliefs at
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other orders. We do this because we want to be able to (i) vary a player's kth-order beliefs
without worrying about the coherency of his beliefs and (ii) measure the impact of this change
on equilibrium strategies without worrying about its impact through the changes in the player's
beliefs at other orders. (The independence assumption will be dropped in our main result.)
We define the beliefs (or type) of a player i inductively. His first order beliefs (about 0) are
represented by a probability distribution t E Al = A () on O. His kth-order beliefs (about
tk l) are represented by a probability distribution t E Ak- A (Akl) on Ak-l The type of
a player i is the list
ti = (t/, t2, t,...)
of all these probability distributions. We write Ti for the set of all possible types t of player
i. We also write T = [Ii Ti for the set of all type profiles t. His beliefs are represented by
the product measure x t x x ... of his beliefs (t1,t ?, t,...) at each order; that is, given
any Hk=o0 Xk C o x T_i, the probability that he assigns to the event {(0, t_i) E Hk=O0 Xk} is
Hl0= tk (Xk-l). (Here, of course, we have used the independence assumption.) We write t\tk
for the belief structure obtained by changing t to t in t; t\tki and ti\ti are defined similarly.
Example 2 (Independent private value environment) Take any incomplete-information game
with payoffs u1i (a; Oi) for each i where each Oi E Oi is independently distributed with some
probability distribution Pi and privately known by player i, and this is common knowledge. This
game can be embedded in our framework, by taking 0 = UiOi, t = 6o,, t = t = Pi o0 -1
where P_i = IjjiPj and : 0-i F-+ Iji-Jj, and taking t = tk- ik-l for each k > 2, where
J6 denotes the measure that puts probability 1 on {x}.
Embedding metric Throughout the paper, we will need a measure of the distances be-
tween probability distributions. We therefore introduce the following metric, which we will call
embedding metric. Let (X, d) be any metric space. Given any u, ,' E A (X), we first write
A,,, = {v E A (X x X) Imarglv = p, marg 2v = /a'} (1.19)
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for the set of all joint probability distributions with marginals /t and Pl', where margi is the
marginal distribution on the ith copy of X. Now we define our embedding metric d on A (X)
by setting
d (, /') = inf E [d (xl, X2)], (1.20)
where E is the expectation operator with respect to v and (, x2) is a generic member of
X x X. It is easy to verify that this is an extension in the following sense: if l and /t' are point
masses at x and x', respectively, then d (, /') = d (x, x') - thus the notational convenience of
using d for both metrics. An equivalent definition is given by
(, ') = inf E [d (Y, Y')] (1.21)
Y.L,Y'..t'
where inf is taken over all pairs Y and Y' of X-valued random variables with distributions l
and u', respectively, and coming from the same probability space, and E is the expectation
operator on this space.
The embedding metric has the following property of preserving Lipschitz continuity; the
proof is in the Appendix. Notice in the lemma that o f - is the distribution of f (Y) for a
random variable Y ou.
Lemma 2 Let (X, dx) and (Z, dz) be two metric spaces, and f: X -- Z be such that
dz (f (x), f (x')) < Adx (x, x') (Vx, x')
for some A. Let also dx and dz be the embedding metrics on A (X) and A (Z), respectively.
Then,
d ( o f- ,/'o f-') < dx (, ') (VP, ')
1.8 Equilibrium Impact with Independence
In this section, using the embedding metric defined above, we will put a natural metric on the
type space, which will allow us to compare variations in different orders of the type space. We
will show that, under the previously stated conditions, variations in higher-order beliefs have a
27
lower impact on equilibrium behavior than comparable variations in lower-order beliefs.
1.8.1 Embedding metric on beliefs
We now apply the embedding-metric construction inductively to define our embedding metric
on beliefs of each player at each order. First, for k = 1, we extend d to A1 = A (O) by setting
d (t, t) = inf E [d (, ')]
at each til, t E A1 and to A'-1 by setting
d (tl , ) max d(t1 t)j~i
at each tl i, i E A - . For any k > 1, we extend d to Ak by setting
d (tk, ti= inf E [d (Y, Y')],
where Y and Y' take values in -1 (whose generic member is t), and to Ak by setting
d (tk i, ki) = max d (t~, t)
at each tki, tk i E A -ll.
1.8.2 Dampening impact of higher-order uncertainty
Assuming global stability, we will now find an upper bound for the change in equilibrium
strategy caused by a change in any kth-order beliefs. When we consider comparable changes
(according to d) at all orders k, this bound will be decreasing exponentially in k.
Proposition 6 Assume that, for each i G N, BRi (., ) is Lipschitz continuous uniformly on,, i.e.,
di (BR i (tl; ) , BR_ (t; )) < cedi (tl, nt) (Vo, trl t) (1.22)
for some a E R. Assume also global stability under uncertainty for parameter b. Then, in the
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model with independence, for any i, ti, k, and any tik,
di (s* (ti), s' (ti\tik)) < abk d (tik, tik) . (1.23)
The conclusion can be spelled out as follows: Change the beliefs of a player at some order k
while all the other beliefs are fixed. The change in the equilibrium strategy due to this change
in the beliefs is at most an exponentially decreasing function of k times the change in the
beliefs according to our embedding metric. In other words, the bound of the rate of change in
equilibrium strategy as a function of kth-order belief is exponentially decreasing in k.
Proof. Firstly, for k = 1, (1.23) is just (1.22). Now assume that (1.23) holds at some k - 1,
i.e., for all j (: N, t, and t-,
dj (s; (tj), s (j\k-1)) < bk-2d(tk-1 ,tk-) (1.24)
For any fixed t and i E N, let us define f : '- A by setting
f (BkRl) = BR_i (t\k_l)
at each ik 1 E An- Fix ii = ti, so that our induction hypothesis (1.24) becomes
d (f (tk-) f (k71)) < obk-2d (tk1 l) Vtxk- ,tl)
Then, by Lemma 2, for any tk-,
d (tk o f 1 tik o f-1) < abk- 2d (ti, ti)
Notice that tk o f-1 and t o f- 1 are the distributions of s* i under t and tti k . Therefore, by
global stabilit;y,
di (* (ti), (ti\ik)) bd (tik f-, tk f- ) oabbk-2d (tik, ik) < abkd (t, k) .
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Proposition 6 yields another bound for the maximum impact of higher-order beliefs as in
Proposition 5. By adding the effects of changes at k + 1st and all higher orders, we obtain the
following corollary. (The validity of this infinite summation follows from Proposition 5.)
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions and the notation of Proposition 6, let De = max0,0 e d (, 0').
Let ti, t be such that tl = ti for all I < k for some k > 1. Then, in the model with independence,
di (s* (ti), s, (ti)) < bkaDe,/ (1- b).
1.8.3 Continuity in product topology
As we mentioned in the Introduction, global stability implies continuity of equilibrium with
respect to the usual topology on the universal type space. In this section, we show a somewhat
stronger continuity property.
Consider the topology of pointwise convergence under the embedding metric. Equilibrium
strategy s is continuous with respect to this topology iff, for any sequence {ti,m}mEN of types,
[tim ti Vk E N] = [s* (ti,m) -- Si (i)] ,
where convergence of beliefs at each order is according to the embedding metric. Also, because
the space of beliefs is compact under the embedding metric, this topology is metrized by the
metric db (called a Fr6chet metric) defined by
00
db (ti, 4i) = b-d (td, i)
k=l
where b is any number in (0, 1). Our next result states that, under global stability, the equilib-
rium strategy is Lipschitz continuous with respect to a Fr6chet metric, and hence it is continuous
in the product topology.
Proposition 7 Under the assumptions and the notation of Proposition 6, in the model with
independence, for each i N, the equilibrium strategy s of player i is Lipschitz continuous
with respect to db. In that case, s* is continuous with respect to the product topology on type
space generated by the embedding metric on beliefs at each order.
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Proof. Fix any two types ti and ti of player i. For each k E N, define the type ti,k by
setting
tl if I < k,
l/ otherwise
at each order 1. We have
00 00
di (S (ti), si (ti)) < j d ( (ti,k) , S (ti,k-)) = ci (Si (ti,k) S (tik ))
k=l k=l
oo
E abk 1 d (tk, ti k) = adb (ti, ti),
k=l
where ca is as defined in Proposition 6, proving the result. To see the first inequality, note that
we can change ti to ti by changing tik to t one at a time. Hence, by Proposition 1, for each
e > 0, there exists an integer such that di (s* (ti), si* (i)) < ZE=L di (s* (ti,k), s? (ti,k-1))+e <
Ek=l di (s (ti,k), s* (ti,k-l))+
-
e. Since e is arbitrary, this yields the inequality. The next equality
is by definition; the next inequality Proposition 6, and the last equality is by definition. ·
Corollary 2 Let S* be the set of Bayesian Nash Equilibria s* that use a singleton selection
from best-response correspondence, and define E* by setting E* (t) = {s* (t) Is* E S*} at each
t E T. Then, under the assumptions of Proposition 6, E* is lower semi-continuous with respect
to the product: topology on type space generated by the embedding metric on beliefs at each order.
Proof. Take any t, any s* (t) E E* (t), and sequence t(n) that converges to t in the
topology above. By definition s* (t) is the value of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s* at t. Then,
by Proposition 7, s* (t (n)) E E* (t (n)) converges to s* (t). ·
1.9 Literature Review
Although there is a sizeable literature on the impact of higher-order uncertainty following
Rubinstein (1989), the focus of most studies has been relaxation of common knowledge and
lower semi-continuity of equilibrium in the worst-case scenarios, such as approximating com-
mon knowledge with common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet (1989)), robustness of equilibrium
against (possibly substantial) payoff uncertainty with small probability (Fudenberg, Kreps, and
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Levine (19881) and Kajii and Morris (1997)), and strong topologies under which equilibrium
is lower semi-continuous uniformly over all games (Monderer and Samet (1997) and Kajii and
Morris (1998)). Most closely related to our work, Morris (2002) analyzes the impact of higher-
order uncertainty within a model with linear best responses, reaching the conclusion that impact
of higher-order beliefs can be arbitrarily large if we require a uniform bound over all games. Our
focus differs in two ways. Firstly, we measure the impact of higher-order uncertainty within
a single game (dropping the uniformity requirement). Second, while our sufficient condition
implies continuity of best response, most of these papers analyze matrix games and naturally
use the supremum metric on the mixed strategies, when the best response is generically discon-
tinuous.
1.10 Conclusion
Present economic theories are mostly based on equilibrium analysis of models in which, con-
ditional on only a few low orders of uncertainty, all higher-order beliefs are assumed to be
common knowledge without any justification. We know, however, that in some games higher-
order uncertainty has a profoundly large impact in equilibrium. In this paper we presented a
sufficient condition, namely global stability under uncertainty, which guarantees that the im-
pact of higher-order uncertainty is low. Using the universal type space, in which players can
entertain any coherent set of beliefs, we have shown under this assumption that if we specify
the players'b eliefs up to some order k, we will know their equilibrium behavior within a bound
that decreases exponentially in k (cf. Proposition 5). That is, if a theoretical prediction re-
quires knowledge of the strategies within a margin e of error, then the researcher can validate
his theory by specifying first k () orders of beliefs, where k () is a logarithmic function of e.
Under a further independence assumption we also formalize our notion that, under stability,
the marginal impact of higher-order uncertainty is (exponentially) decreasing in the order (cf.
Propositions 2 and 6). That is, the problem must be approximated using lower-order uncer-
tainty rather than higher-order uncertainty; this may be reversed when stability does not hold,
as the impact of higher-order uncertainty may grow exponentially. In the latter case, we believe
that accurate prediction using traditional analysis will be impossible.
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When the best responses are always unique, we have a dominance-solvable game, and hence
our analysis would not change if we considered refinements of equilibrium or non-equilibrium
concepts, such as rationalizability. Nevertheless, in general, our use of normal-form represen-
tation and the solution concept of (unrestricted) Bayesian Nash equilibrium does impose an
important limitation which requires further research. Many theories are based on extensive-
form representations and use refinements, such as sequential rationality (Selten (1974), Kreps
and Wilson (1982)). Their predictions are often driven by these refinements when equilibrium
itself does not have any predictive power in their games. It is then crucial to extend our analy-
sis to such a framework, using extensive-form constructions, such as Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(1999).
1.11 Omitted Proofs
1.11.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Take any ,u, IL' E (X), and fix any > 0. By definition of d (, L'), there exists v E A,/,
such that
E, [dx (Xl, x2)] < d (, IL') + e. (1.25)
Define f: X2 Z2 by f (X1, x2) = (f (XI) , f ( 2)). Then, by definition, vofl- E Aof-,pof-i.
Hence,
dz ( fl' o f- ) < Evof-x [dz (Z1, 2)]
- E, [dz (f (Xl), f (X2))]
< E [Adx (l, x 2 )] = AEv [dx ( 1, X2)]
< Adx (L, ') + Ac;
since is arbitrary, the result follows. [Here, the first inequality is by (1.20); the next equality
is by change of variables, the next inequality is by the hypothesis, and the last inequality is by
(1.25).] D
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1.11.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We will now show that global stability implies that our game is dominance solvable. Beforehand,
we formally define our elimination method and develop some notation needed in the proof.
Rationalizability Assume that, for each player i, his best response correspondence is single-
valued, given by the best response function BRi. (Recall that this is the case whenever ui
is continuous and strictly quasi-concave, and Ai is convex.) For each i, let Mi C AT be the
set of all measurable functions si: Ti -+ Ai, i.e., the set of all allowable strategies for player
i. Define sets Sk k = 0,1,..., iteratively as follows. Set S = A . For each k > 0, let
A-d1 = A (sk 1 n M_i) be the set of all possible beliefs of player i on other players' allowable
strategies that are not eliminated in the first k - 1 rounds. Write 7r/,-_i for the induced beliefs
of i on O x A.-i by his type ri and his belief oai E A (Mi) about the other players' strategies.
Write S (ri) = {BR (r,,_a ) -_i E Ek? 1} for the set of all best responses of i with type
Ti against all his beliefs in ki , and set Sk = Ir Sk (Ti). The set of all rationalizable
strategies for i is S = (no=0 Sk) n Mi.
Proof of Proposition 1. For each non-negative integer k, define
Dk = sup di (si (i) , Si (i)) .
iEN,TiE,si,si ESik
We will show that limk,, Dk = 0; therefore, there cannot be any two distinct actions si (-i)
and s (Ti) available to any type Ti of any player i in the limit of the process of elimination,
showing the first part. The second part simply follows from the observation that s* E Sk for
each k, hence s E S?.
Towards showing that limk,,oo Dk = 0, assume global stability for some parameter b and
metric dai, and take any k, and any i E N, i E i,s i, si E S. By definition, si (i) =
BRi (rT,_ai) and s' (Ti) = BRi(ri,z ) for some ai, a' i E kl 1. Hence,
di (Si (Tri) , si (Ti)) = di (BRi (i,r i) , B (~i, ci) ) < bd-i (7ai,_ i , 1ri, i) (1.26)
On the other hand, for each w = (, r), define p/, = x (i o 1) and ' = x P('_ i op o1),
where p, : -i - s-i (-i) and Jo is the point mass at 0; define also /, =/, x t . Notice that
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, and b' are the probability distributions on (E x A-i conditional on w, induced by beliefs a_i
and a'__ respectively. Notice also that 7i,a i = f/t, (.) di ()) 7i, = f1/ () d (),
and v -f , () dr- () I Moreover, since ai, ' E k , given any w =
(0, T), and any ((0, si (Ti)) (0, s' i (T-i))) E A,, we have d_i ((, -i (T-i)), (0, s' i (Ti))) =
di (s-i (T-i), s'_i (T-i)) < Dk-l, yielding
(L-i (7r'i,-i, 7rr-ia' i) < E, [di (l, X2)] = EA [di (X1 ,X2 )] < Dk-- (1.27)
By combining, (1.26) and (1.27), we obtain
di (i (Ti), s (i)) K bDk-.l.
By taking the supremum on both sides, we obtain
Dk < bDk_l.
Therefore, 0 <K Dk < bkDo, showing that limk,, Dk = 0. ·
1.11.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Let P -x P =x P'. Since we have separable standard Borel spaces, there exists conditional
probability P( I) : (EXxy) x (X x Y) - [0, 1] with respect to the a-field Ex x {Y}, and
we simply write P (BIx) for P (X x BII (x, y)) where y can be chosen arbitrarily. We define
P (Clx) similarly for each C E Ez. Notice that P (. x) and P' ( Ix) are probability distributions
on (Y, Ey) and (Z, Ez), respectively.8 For each x E X, let
PI -P( x) x P' (Ix)
be the product measure of P (. Ix) and P' ( Ix) on Y x Z, and define probability measure P by
setting
P(F) = P (F)dP(x)
8See Parthasaraty (1967) for the results of probability theory in this proof.
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at each measurable set F C X x Y x Z where
F = {(y,z) E Y x Zj (x,y,z) E F}.
Notice that, for any rectangle x B x C E Exx Ey X z,
P(E x B x C) = (x) P(BIx) '(Clx) dP (x),
where Xe denotes the characteristic function of O.
Now we show that P satisfies the statement of the lemma. For each E E Ex and B E Ey,
we have
xxyP(e x B) P(e x B x Z)
= | Xe (x) P (BIx) P' (Zlx) dP (x)
= | xe (x) P (B x) dP (x)
- P( x B).
Since the probability measures xxYP and P agree on the r-system of all rectangles E x B,
which generates the entire a-field on X x Y, by Dynkin's 7r-A Theorem they are equal. This is
similarly true for xxZP and P'.
1.11.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumptions la and lb, take any i E N. Firstly, if /i = 0, then gi (0, a_i) = gi (0, a'i) =
.i (0) for each (0, a_i, a' i), hence, for each 7r, 7r' with ezr =e 7r', we have BR (7r) = fi (E, (9i (0))) =
fi (E,r (0i (0))) = BR (i'), yielding di (BRi (r) , BRi (7')) = 0 < bid_i (ir, 7r') for any di.
Now assume that Oi > 0. Since gi is continuous and 0 x A-i is compact, there exists Mi > 0
such that
dx (gi (, a_i) , gi (O', a' i)) < Mi (VO, a_,',a' i) (1.28)
Define a metric dE,i on E by setting de,i (0, 0') = Mi/i at each distinct 0, 0', and define d_i
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on E x A-i by
d-i ((9, a-i), (', a' i)) de,i (0, 0') + d-i (ai, ai).
Now, take any two random variables (0, ai) ' 7r and (', a'i) a w' that come from the same
probability space and write p for the probability that 0 0'. Note that
E [d_i ((O, ai) , (', a'i))] = pMi /i + E [d-i (ai, a'i)] . (1.29)
Moreover, we have
di (BRi (7r), BRi (r')) < aiE [dx (gi (O, a_i) ,gi (O, a'_i))]
iE [dx ( ( 0, ai), gi (0, ')) : 0 0 ']
+eiE [dx ( (0, a_i), gi (0, aL'-) 0= ']
< ceipM + o/iPiE [di (ai, a'i): 0 = Ol]
< cipMi + OciiE [d-i (a-i, a' i)]
= bi (pMi//ii + E [di (a-i, a_i)])
- biE [d i ((0, a_i), (', ai))] ,
where the first inequality is derived as in the proof of Proposition 3, the next equality is by
additivity, the next equality is by (1.28) and the Lipschitz continuity of gi, the next inequality
is by the non--negativity of d-i, and the last two equalities are by definition of bi and (1.29).
Since (, a_i) - 7r and (', ai) ' 7r' are arbitrary, this shows that di (BRi (r), BR (r')) <
biE [_i (, ')] 
1.11.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Take any ir, ir' in A(e x A_i) with marge7r =margear' - t . We will assume BRi (r) and
BR (r') are in the interior of Ai. (When Ai is convex, we can take BRi (r) and BR (r') as the
unconstrained optima, as in that case the variations in the constrained optima are if anything
less than the variations in unconstrained optima.) We write u, uii, and uj for the first and
second order partial derivatives of ui with respect to ai, and the cross partial with respect
ai and aj, respectively. Firstly, since BRi (r) and BRi (r') are in the interior, the first order
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conditions for optimization problems with 7 and 7rt yield
ui(o , BRi (7r), ai)dr(, a-i) = 0 (1.30)
and
ui(O, BRi(7r'), ai) dr'(E, a-i) = 0, (1.31)
respectively. Let
J = ui(O, BRi(7r), a-i)dr'(O, a-i)
be the value of the derivative at BR (r) for the optimization problem with 7r'. We will now
find upper and lower bounds for IJI, and these bounds will yield (??). First we find an upper
bound. Letting be an arbitrary element of X,trr,
IJI = ui(, BRi(7), ai)dr'(O, ai)J ui(0, BRi(7r), ai) dir'(, ai) - ui(0, BRi(7r), ai)dir(, ai) (1.32)
ui(O, BRi(r), ai) - ui(O, BRi(ir), a'_i)d-y(O, a_i, a i)
< ui(, BRi(7r), a_) - ui(, BRi(7r), a' i) dty(0, ai a'i) (1.33)
/jZi maax Iij (a;O) d_-i (ai a' i)] d(0 ai, a'i)
= max Iuj (a;) [d ; ) a-i, a' )] dy(O, a-i, a) (1.34)
ji a
Here the first equality is by definition, the second equality is by (1.30), and the following
inequality is is by the triangle inequality. To derive the penultimate inequality, we write
U (BRi (), a'i) - u (BRi (r), a) as the sum of the changes that we would get by changing
each coordinate in turn, and apply the mean value theorem to each, obtaining
ui (13Ri (), ai) - u(BRi (r) ,a-i) < Zmax uj (a; ) Iaj - a
< E max uj (a; O) di (a-i, ai),
j ai
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where the last inequality is by our definition of the metric d_i. To find our lower bound, we
write
IJl ui(0, BRi(r), ai)dr'(, ai) 
= J ui(0, BRi(7r), a-i)d7r'(0, ai)- ui(, BRi(7'), ai)dT'(E, ai)
= J ui(0, BRi(r), ai) - ui(, BRi(7r'), ai)d7r'(0, aji)
> /[min nuii (a; 0) BRi (r)- BRi (r')l]
min luii (a; 0) BRi (r) - BRi (r') . (1.35)
Here the first and the second equalities are by definition and (1.31), respectively. The third
equality is crucial; we have equality here because U (; a' i) is strictly decreasing, and hence
Ui (BR (u), a' i)- Ui (BRi ('), a' ) never changes its sign. The inequality in the next
line is again by the mean value theorem, and the last equality is because the term inside
the expectation is a constant. Combining (1.34) and (1.35) and observing that d_i(r, 7r') =
infyA(exA_ ) f di (a-i, a' _i) dy(O, ai, a' i) and that y was arbitrary, we obtain
maxa u (a; )I
BRi (7r) - BR (r') di (r,7r') E mina (a; 0)
Check that maxa I uj (a; 0) dt I (0) < f maxa 102 ui (0, a) /OaiOaj dti (0) and mina If uii (a; 0) dti (0) >
f mina 02ui (0, a) /0ai2I dt 1 (0). Therefore,
maxa Uij (a; tl) f maxa1 2ui (0 a) /&aiaj dtil (0)
. mina Uii (a;tl) -. fmina 2ui(0a)/ai 2 dtil()
ji f maxa 2 ui (, a) /0aiOajl dti(0mina j'i (a; t!) f mina j2 u (0, a) /a I dt ()
oiJ min ld2i(0aa\la2 ti (0
< ma~ max ma 2 ui (0, a) /aiajl <1
-- ° .. mina 102Ui (0, a) /Oa2
completing the proof.
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Chapter 2
Finite-order implications of any
equilibrium
"Game theory ... is deficient to the extent it assumes other features to be
common knowledge, such as one player's probability assessment about another's
preferences or information. I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on
successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful
analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge
assumption will the theory approximate reality." Wilson (1987)
2.1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the fundamental solution concept in modern economic analysis. It is well-
understood that equilibrium outcomes may be highly dependent on informational assumptions.
Nevertheless, most economic theories include a very specific informational assumption, usually
without sufficient justification. They take a type structure, where a type is a fundamental pay-
off parameter or a belief (i.e., signal) about fundamentals, and assume that the specified type
structure is common knowledge. Formally, they close the model after specifying the first and
second-order beliefs. That is to say, conditional on the first-order beliefs, all of the players'
1Here the first-order beliefs are the beliefs about fundamentals (e.g., signals), and the second-order beliefs are
beliefs about other players' beliefs about fundamentals, specified through the joint distribution of the signals.
43
higher-order beliefs are assumed to be common knowledge. Since this and similar assump-
tions about higher-order beliefs may easily fail in the actual incomplete-information situation
modeled, these theories may be misleading when the impact of higher-order beliefs on equilib-
rium behavior is large. There are examples that show that this impact might be large in some
situations (Rubinstein (1989)), and we need to revise important theories, such as the Coase con-
jecture (Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2002)) and the surplus extraction property (Neeman (2004),
Heifetz and Neeman (2003)), once we relax the common knowledge assumption. In this paper
we characterize, for generic games, the set of predictions that are robust to assumptions about
higher-order beliefs. Alternatively, we measure the sensitivity of behavior to these assumptions
within a fixed equilibrium. Our results suggest that many more predictions are non-robust than
previously thought.
These models typically have a large number of equilibria. Recognizing this, game theorists
exerted tremendous effort in the last several decades to refine the concept of equilibrium, re-
sulting in a multitude of refinement concepts. In application the researchers typically use these
refinements (or some specific arguments) to focus on a particular equilibrium or small class of
equilibria. Most of the statements in economic theory are predictions about the players'b ehav-
ior according to these selected equilibria. Our methodology allows us to check the robustness
of such predictions with respect to assumptions about higher-order beliefs.
Consider a situation where players have incomplete information about some payoff-relevant
parameter. Imagine a researcher who has computed an equilibrium of this game in the universal
type space, where a type of a player is given by the infinite hierarchy of his beliefs-his first-
order beliefs, second-order beliefs, etc. The researcher would like to make a prediction about
the action of a player i according to this equilibrium. Fix a type ti of player i as his actual type,
and write Al (ti) for the set of all actions that are played by some alternative type of i whose
first-order beliefs agree with ti. This set is the set of actions that the researcher cannot rule
out if he only knows the first-order beliefs and assumes that the player plays according to the
equilibrium. Similarly, write Aik (ti) for the set of actions that the researcher cannot rule out if
he only knows the first k orders of beliefs. Write A? (ti) for the limit of these (decreasing) sets
as k approaches infinity, i.e., the set of all actions that cannot be ruled out by the researcher
by looking at (arbitrarily many) finite orders of beliefs.
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In a model that is closed at order k, all higher-order beliefs are determined by the first k
orders of beliefs and the assumption that is made to close the model. Fixing an equilibrium of
this closed model, we wish to analyze how the model's predictions according to this equilibrium
are sensitive to the closing assumption. Dropping the closing assumption, one can construct
a universal type space that contains the model as a subspace. Fix an equilibrium on the
universal type space whose restriction to the model is the fixed equilibrium above. According
to this equilibrium, the model predicts a unique action for each possible set of beliefs at orders
1 through k, namely the equilibrium action for the complete type implied by this set of beliefs
and the closing assumption. But in the general model, every other action in Ai (ti) is played
by a type whose first k orders of beliefs will be exactly as this type (but will fail the closing
assumption.) Therefore, we cannot rule out any action in A~ (ti) without resorting to the
closing assumption. Therefore, a prediction based on the fixed equilibrium is robust to the
closing assumption if and only if the prediction remains true for each selection from Ak.
Our main result gives a lower bound for Ai (ti). Assume that the space of underlying
uncertainty is rich enough so that our fixed equilibrium has full range, i.e., every action is
played by some type. (This assumption is without loss of generality. In Sections 2.6 and 2.8, we
extend our results beyond this assumption.) For countable-action games, we show that Ak (ti)
includes all actions which survive the first k iterations of eliminating all actions which are never
a strict best reply under ti. That is, a prediction of a model that is closed at order k is robust
to the model's assumptions about higher-order beliefs only if the prediction remains true for
all actions that survive the first k iterations of this elimination process. In particular, A? (ti)
includes all actions that survive iterated elimination of actions that cannot be a strict best
reply.
Towards a full characterization of Ak (ti), we also provide an upper bound: A k (ti) is a subset
of the actions that survive the first k iterations of eliminating strictly dominated actions, and
hence A' (ti) is a subset of the rationalizable actions. When there are no ties for best response,
these elimination procedures lead to the same outcome, and therefore A?° (ti) is precisely equal
to the set of rationalizable outcomes. That is, for generic games, a prediction of a model that
is closed at order k is robust to the model's assumptions about higher-order beliefs if only
if the prediction remains (approximately) true for all actions that survive kth-order iterated
45
dominance. We extend this characterization to nice games, where the action spaces are one-
dimensional compact intervals and the utility functions are strictly concave in own action and
continuous, as in many classical economic models.
To illustrate the main argument in the proof of the lower bound, we now explain why Al (ti)
includes all actions that survive the first round of elimination process. Let ti vary over the set of
types that agree with ti at first order (i.e., concerning the underlying parameter) but may have
any beliefs at; higher orders (i.e., concerning the other players' type profile.) Our full-range
assumption implies that there are types ti with any beliefs whatsoever about other players'
equilibrium action profile. Given any action ai of i that is a strict best reply to his fixed belief
about the parameter and some belief about the other players' actions, there is a type ti who
has these beliefs in equilibrium, and therefore must play the strict best reply, ai, in equilibrium.
This argument will be formalized as part of an inductive proof of the main result.
Our result has serious implications on important research areas:
* Wilson Doctrine: Wilson (1987) proposes to approximate the unrestricted model by clos-
ing the model at higher orders, specifying more orders of beliefs, and hence weakening
the common knowledge assumption. Assuming no ties and equilibria with full range, our
result shows that this program will be successful for and only for the predictions that are
true for all rationalizable outcomes. The proposed approximation is then possible under
an equilibrium if and only if the game is dominance-solvable.
* Continuity of Equilibrium: It is well known that some Nash equilibria may be discontinu-
ous in product topology and with respect to higher-order uncertainty, as in the electronic-
mail game of Rubinstein (1989). There is an interest in understanding how severe this
discontinuity is. Monderer and Samet (1989,1997) and Kajii and Morris (1998) have an-
alyzed the weakest topologies that make the equilibrium continuous over all games (see
also Milgrom and Weber (1985) for a continuity result.) These topologies are quite strong,
but since they focus on the worst-case games, such as the electronic-mail game, it is not
clear whether the equilibria used in applications will be highly sensitive to higher-order
uncertainty. We show that every equilibrium with full range is discontinuous for every
game at every type for which two or more actions survive our elimination process.
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* Equilibrium Refinements in Normal-form: Our result shows that, for generic games with
(potentially) rich spaces of fundamentals, an equilibrium refinement does not produce any
new robust prediction.2 That is, any new prediction gained by the equilibrium refinement
will also be dependent on the specific closing assumption and will be invalid under different
assumptions on higher-order beliefs.
* Global Games: In this literature, one uses a limit argument to selects an equilibrium
among multiple strict equilibria, but we show that every equilibrium with full range is
discontinuous at the limit.
* Ex-post Equilibrium: Our result shows that predictions of ex-post equilibrium (computed
within a traditional type space) need not be robust against higher-order beliefs-contrary
to common perception.
There is a close link between higher-order reasoning and the impact of higher-order uncer-
tainty within a fixed equilibrium with full range. When there are no ties, assuming kth-order
mutual knowledge of payoffs and that the fixed equilibrium is played is equivalent to assuming
kth-order mutual knowledge of rationality and common knowledge of payoffs.3 This implies
that when the equilibrium is sensitive to high-order beliefs, the impact of high-order failures of
rationality is also large.
Rationalizability characterizes the strategy profiles that are consistent with common knowl-
edge of rationality (Tan and Werlang (1988)). The latter assumption is equivalent to equilib-
rium in a type space with epistemic types (describing players' beliefs about the actions played).
That is, there exists a type space--with epistemic types-in which each rationalizable strategy
is played by a type. Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) further shows that rationalizability and a
posteriori equilibrium, a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium, yield the same payoff
distributions. Therefore, once one allows for subjectivity in players' priors and arbitrary type
spaces (with possibly epistemic types), then any equilibrium prediction that universally holds
for all equilibria must also hold for all rationalizable strategies. Allowing private information,
2For dynamic: games, which are usually non-generic, extensive-form refinements based on forward induction
may lead to strong robust predictions (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)).
3 The relationship between assumptions about rationality and payoff uncertainty is not straightforward; At
may differ from both rationalizability and iterative admissibility.
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Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) introduces a notion of A-rationalizability that incorporates a
given restriction A on the first-order beliefs (about both underlying uncertainty and the strate-
gies) into the elimination process. Once again, as they show, there exists a type space with
epistemic types in which each A-rationalizable strategy is played by some type in an equilib-
rium that satisfies the restriction A. In contrast, we analyze the sensitivity of an arbitrary fixed
equilibrium to the assumptions on higher-order beliefs and characterize the robust predictions
by usual rationalizability in generic games, without using any epistemic types.
Our next section contains the basic definitions and preliminary results. We formulate our
notion of robustness in Section 2.3. We present and prove our main results in Section 2.4.
Our main theorem is extended to the nice games as a characterization in Section 2.5, and to
mixed strategies and to the spaces of uncertainty that are not necessarily rich in Section 2.6. In
Section 2.7, we present our discontinuity results and discuss their methodological implications
for global games and robustness of equilibria. Section 2.8 contains a very negative result about
Cournot oligopoly as an application. We review the literature in Section 2.9. Section 2.10
concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 Basic Definitions and Preliminary Results
Notation 1 Given any list Y1, . . . , Yn of sets, write Y = fi Yi, Y-i = Ijoi Yj, yi = (yl,..., yi-_l, yi+l, ...
Y_i, and (yi, y-i) = (Y, ... Yi-l, Yi, Yi+l,. . . Yn). Likewise, for any family of functions fj :
Yj -- Zj, we define f-i: Y-i - Z-i by f-i (y-i) = (fj (Yj))jhi. Given any metric space (Y, d),
we write A(Y) for the space of probability distributions on Y, suppressing the fixed v-algebra on
Y which at least contains all open sets and singletons; we use the product a-algebra in product
spaces. The support of a probability distribution r is denoted by (r).
We consider a game with finite set of players N = {1, 2,.. ., n}. The source of underlying
uncertainty is a payoff-relevant parameter 0 E O where (, d) is a compact, complete and sep-
arable metric space, with d a metric on set e. Each player i has action space Ai and utility
function ui: E x A -+ R, where A = [1i Ai. We endow the game with the universal type space
of Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), a variant of an earlier construction by Mertens and Zamir
(1985), with an additional assumption that the players' beliefs at each finite order have count-
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able (or finite) support. 4 Types are defined using the auxiliary sequence {Xk} of sets defined
inductively by Xo = O and Xk = [ (Xkl)] x Xk_1 for each k > 0, where A (Xkl-1) is the set
of probability distributions on Xk_1 that have countable (or finite) support. We endow each Xk
with the weak topology and the a-algebra generated by this topology. A player i's first order
beliefs (about the underlying uncertainty 0) are represented by a probability distribution t on
Xo, second order beliefs (about all players' first order beliefs and the underlying uncertainty)
are represented by a probability distribution t2 on X1, etc. Therefore, a type ti of a player i
is a member of 1 -IJ=l i (Xk-l). Since a player's kth-order beliefs contain information about
his lower-order beliefs, we need the usual coherence requirements. We write T = RiEN Ti for
the subset of (k= 1 (Xk_l)) in which it is common knowledge that the players' beliefs are
coherent, i.e., the players know their own beliefs and their marginals from different orders agree.
We will use the variables ti, ti E Ti as generic types of any player i and t, t E T as generic type
profiles. For every ti E Ti, there exists a probability distribution ti on x Ti such that
ti = tk-1 x margox[A(Xk_2)IN\{i}nti, (Vk) (2.1)
and t = margeKti, where tk-l is the probability measure that puts probability 1 on the set
{tik-1 } and marg denotes the marginal distribution. Conversely, given any distribution ti on
e x T_i, we can define ti E Ti via (2.1), as long as margax[A(xk-2)]N\p}iti is always countable.
A strategy of a player i is any measurable function si: Ti --+ Ai. Given any type ti and
any profile s--i of strategies, we write 7r (. ti, s_i) E ( x A_i) for the joint distribution of
the underlying uncertainty and the other players' actions induced by ti and s_i; 7r (.Iti, ai) is
similarly defined for correlated mixed strategy profile a-i. For each i E N and for each belief
7r E ( x A_i), we write BR (r) for the set of actions ai E Ai that maximize the expected
value of ui (0, a, ai) under the probability distribution 7r. A strategy profile s* = (s*, s,...)
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium iff at each ti,
s, (ti) E BRi ( (.Iti, Si) ).
4 This assumption is made to avoid technical issues related to measurability (see Remark 2.) Our type space
is dense in universal type space, and any countable type space with no redundant type is embedded in our space.
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An equilibrium s* is said to have full range iff
s* (T) = A. (FR)
We extend our analysis beyond this full range assumption in Section 2.6. Moreover, this assump-
tion is without loss of generality, as we can restrict the action space to s* (T), by eliminating the
actions that are never played in equilibrium s*. Finally, full range is implied by the assumption
in the following lemma, which states that the state space O is sufficiently rich. This assumption
corresponds to allowing the broadest possible set of beliefs about other players' payoffs, which
should be allowed when we drop all common-knowledge assumptions.
Lemma 3 Assume that, given any i E N, any E (A-i), and any ai, there exists a proba-
bility distribution v on E with countable support and such that
BRi (v x )= {ai}.
Then, every equilibrium s* has full range.
Proof. The proofs that are omitted in the text are in the appendix. 
Elimination Processes We will use interim notions and allow correlations not only within
players' strategies but also between their strategies and the underlying uncertainty 0. Such
correlated rationalizability is introduced by Battigalli (2003), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)
and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2003). Clearly, allowing such correlation only makes our
sets larger. Since our main result is a lower bound in terms of these sets, this only strengthens
our result. Moreover, our characterization provides yet another justification for this correlated
rationalizability. Write Mi for the set of all measurable functions from E x Ti to Ai. Towards
defining rationalizability, define sets Sik [ti], i E N, ti E Ti, k = 0, 1,..., iteratively as follows.
Set Si [ti] = Ai. For each k > 0, let CkIl  M-i be the set of all measurable functions
f: 0e x T_i - A_i such that f (0, ti) E Skt -1 [t_i] for each t-i. Let also Ek-1 be the set of all
probability distributions on Sk l. Note that Sk_7 1 is the set of all possible beliefs of player i on
50
other players' allowable actions that are not eliminated in the first k - 1 rounds. Write
sk[ti] = U BRi(a(lti, Hi ))
for the set of all all actions ai of i that are best reply against some of his beliefs in Ek1. The
set of all rationalizable actions for player i (with type ti) is
00
St [ti] = n Sk [ti].
k=O
Next we define the set of strategies that survive iterative elimination of strategies that are
never strict best reply, denoted by W00 [ti], similarly. We set W ° [ti] = Ai and
Wik [ti] = {aiIBRi( (ti, 5-i)) = {ai) for some a-i E A (\ lti) } 
where Wk - C M-i is the set of all functions f: x T-i - A-i such that f (0, t-i) E Wk - 1 [ti]
with probability 1 under ti. Finally, we set
00
W [ti] n Wik [ti]
k=O
Notice that we eliminate a strategy if it is not a strict best-response to any belief on the remain-
ing strategies of the other players. Clearly, this yields a smaller set than the result of iterative
admissibility (i.e., iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies). 5 In some games, it-
erative admissibility may yield strong predictions. For example, in finite perfect information
games it leads to backwards induction outcomes. Nevertheless, in generic normal-form games
(as defined in Definition 1 below), all these concepts are equivalent and usually have weak
predictive power.
Remark 1 Any model can be embedded in the universal type space as long as there are no
redundant types, i.e., multiple types with identical belief hierarchy. We will henceforth use the
5 In particular, if we use non-reduced normal-form of an extensive-form game, many strategies will be outcome
equivalent, in which case our procedure will eliminate all of these strategies. To avoid such over-elimination, we
can use reduced-form, by representing all outcome-equivalent strategies by only one strategy.
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terms model and subspace interchangeably. If there are redundant types in the model, one needs
to consider a larger type space (Ely and Peski (2004)) in order to analyze the robustness of
predictions. The results of such an analysis will, if anything, show more sensitivity to the
assumptions about higher-order beliefs.
Closing Assumption We say that a type space (or model) T C T is closed at order k if
there are no two distinct t, t E T such that t = t for each I < k. In that case, there is a
well-defined, one-to-one function yit: Projk (T) - T, which we call the closing assumption
for T, such that 7Yt (Projk (t)) = t for each t E T, where Projk is the projection to the first k
orders of beliefs.
2.3 Robustness to higher-order beliefs
We are interested in how robust equilibrium is against the failure of assumptions made at
high orders, such as the failure of the common knowledge assumption at high orders. We now
formalize our notion of robustness.
Consider a model T C T that is closed at order k. We want to check the robustness of
the model's predictions according to a class of equilibria. Some of the equilibria of model T
will not be a part of any equilibrium defined globally on the universal type space. Since the
existence of such equilibria depends on the closing assumption for T, we will not consider such
equilibria. We therefore fix any family S* of equilibria s* on T and focus on equilibria s* on
T, where Si- is simply the restriction of s* to T. Given any (propositional) formula Q with
free variable in AT, we say that Q is a prediction of T with respect to S* iff Q (SI) is true for
each s* S*. This formulation of prediction is very general, and a prediction need not depend
on the actions of all types in T. For example, a prediction may state that the bidders with the
lowest valuation bid 0 in a certain set of equilibria, which only depends on the actions of those
types, or may state that the bidding function is increasing with the bidders' valuations, which
depends on all types. For any such prediction Q, we say that Q is robust to (the assumptions
about) higher-order beliefs iff Q (s* o y o Projk) is true for each s* E S* and each alternative
closing assumption y. To illustrate this, see the diagram in Figure 2-1: a prediction with respect
to s* is robust if it remains true for all functions defined by traversing any possible paths in the
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\S*
Projk(T) A
Figure 2-1: Robustness to choice of closing assumption
diagram. That is, the prediction remains true independent of the choice of closing assumption.
We often need a prediction to be approximately true, e.g., the bidder with the lowest
valuation does not bid more than e. In our formulation, one can modify a prediction so that it
is stated approximately and check the robustness of the modified prediction. Notice also that a
model that is closed at order k can also be considered to be closed at order k' > k. In checking
robustness, one can choose k in order to check robustness to the assumptions about the beliefs
at orders higher than k. This is clearer in the following equivalent formulation.
Fix an equilibrium s* and a type t of a player i. According to equilibrium, he will play
s* (ti). Now imagine a researcher who only knows the first k orders of beliefs of player i and
knows that equilibrium s* is played. All the researcher can conclude from this information is
that i will play one of the actions in
Ai [s*, ti] {s * (t i) tim = t Vm < k}.
Assuming, plausibly, that a researcher can verify only finitely many orders of a player's beliefs,
all a researcher can ever know is that player i will play one of the actions in
00
A?° [s*, ti] = n Ai [*, ti] .
k=O
Notation 2 We write Ak [s*, t] = Hi Ak [s*, ti], Sk [S*, t] = Ij Sik [ti], etc.
The sets A/k [s*, ti] can be used to characterize the predictions of a model closed at order k
that are robust to higher-order beliefs, as in the next lemma.
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Lemma 4 A prediction Q of a model T that is closed at order k, with respect to equilibria
S*, is robust to higher-order beliefs if and only if Q (s) is true for each selection s from the
correspondence Ak [s*,.]: T - 2 A and for each s* C S*.
2.4 Main Results
We are now ready to prove our main result for countable-action games, i.e., games where each
player i has a countable or finite action space Ai.
Proposition 8 For any countable-action game, any equilibrium s* with full range, any k E N,
i E N, and any ti,
Wk [ti] C A [s*, ti] C Si [ti];
in particular,
w? [ti] C A [s*, ti] S [ti] 
Proof. We first show that Wik [ti] C Ak [s*, ti]. For k = 0, the statement is given by
the full-range assumption. For any given k and any player i, write each ti as ti = (, h)
where I = (ti, t2i, ..,t 1) and h = (ti, tk1 ,..) are the lower and higher-order beliefs,
respectively. Let L = {l113h: (1, h) E T_i}. The induction hypothesis is that
wk-l [1] -U ki- 1 [(1, h')] C Ak-T1 [s*, (1, h)] (V (1, h) E Ti)
h'
Fix any type ti and any ai E Wk [ti]. We will construct a type ti such that s (ti) = ai
and the first k orders of beliefs are same under t and ti, showing that ai E A [s*, ti]. Now,
by definition, for some a_-i E (Wkil), ai is the unique best reply for type ti if t assigns
probability distribution ai on the other players' strategies, i.e., BRi( (lti, o-i)) = {ai}. Let
P (.Iti, _i) be the probability distribution on O x L x A_i induced by zti and a-i. By the
induction hypothesis, for each (1, a_i) E suppP (-ti, _i), ai E Wk -1 [1] C A k 1 [s*, (1, h)]
for some h. Hence, there exists a mapping p: suppP (ti, ai) - 0 x T_i,
: (, 1, ai) ( , ,h (a_i,, 1)) , (2.2)
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such that
s*i (1, h (ai, 0,1)) = a_i. (23)
We define t l:)y
K;~i P (-ti, Ci) o -1
the probability distribution induced on E( x Ti by the mapping p, and the probability dis-
tribution P (lti, ai). Notice that, since t has countable support and the action spaces are
countable, the set suppP (. ti, ai) is countable, in which case p is trivially measurable. Hence
ti is well-defined. By construction of , the first k orders of beliefs (about (0, 1)) are identical
under t and ti:
margoxLli = margoxLP ('Iti, a_i) o -1 = margexLP (.lti, -_i) = margexxLKti,
where the second inequality is by (2.2) and the last equality is by definition of P (.Iti,a-i).
Moreover, using the mapping y: (0, 1, h) - (0, 1, s*i (1, h)), we can check that the distribution
induced by &iii and s* i on x L x Ai is
P (Iti, =i) Kti o y-1 = p (.Iti, a_i) o [-1 o y-l = p (ti, a-i) ,
where the last equality is due to the fact that , is the inverse of the restriction of y to suppji.
Therefore,
7T (.Iti, si) = margexLP (Iti, s i) = margExLP (lti, a-i) = 7r (lti, _i).
That is, the equilibrium beliefs of ti about E3 x A_i are identical to the beliefs of t about
E x A-i when ti assigns probability distribution -_i on the other players' strategies. Since ai
is the only best reply to these beliefs, ti must play ai in equilibrium:
s* (ti) c BRi( (ti, s*i)) = BRR (r (It, a_)) = {ai}. (2.4)
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To see the inclusion Ak [s*, ti] C Sk [ti], observe that for any ti with t7 = t? for eack m < k,
we have
8* (ti) E S [tC] S [ti] -St [ti-
where the last, equality is due to the fact that Sik [ti] depends only on the first k orders of beliefs
(t,. . . ,t), completing the proof. [For a constructive but much longer proof of the last part,
see our earlier working paper.] ·
Remark 2 Notice that the countability assumptions about the finite-order beliefs and the action
spaces are used only to make sure that ni, is a well-defined probability distribution, or / is
measurable. In fact, whenever L is measurable, our proof is valid. In the next section, we
present another class of games in which y/ is measurable; may not be measurable in general.
These assumptions are not needed at all for the inclusion A k [s*, ti] C Sik [ti].
The conclusion that Wk [ti] C Ak [s*, ti] can be spelled out as follows. Suppose that we
know a player's beliefs up to the kth order and do not have any further information. Suppose
also that he has an action ai that survives k rounds of iterated elimination of strategies that
cannot be a strict best reply-for some type whose first k orders of beliefs are as specified.
Then, we cannot rule out that ai will be played in equilibrium s*. Put it differently, if we have
a model that is closed at order k and if an action survives k rounds of iterated elimination
of strategies that cannot be a best reply for a type within the model, then we cannot rule
out action ai as an equilibrium action for that type without invoking the closing assumption.
Hence, any prediction that does not follow from the first k steps of this elimination process
is not robust to higher-order beliefs, no matter which set of equilibria is considered. Such a
prediction depends crucially on the closing assumptions, and cannot be deduced from just the
assumptions that lead to a specific equilibrium s*. This suggests that, contrary to the current
practice in economics, a researcher needs to justify his closing assumption at least as much as
the other assumptions, such as the rationale for equilibrium selection. This is stated in the next
proposition.
Proposition 9 Consider a countable-action game, a set S* of equilibria s*, each with full
range, and any model T that is closed at order k. If a prediction Q of T with respect to S* is
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robust to higher-order beliefs, then Q (s) is true for each selection s from the correspondence
W]k, defined on T. Conversely, if a prediction Q (s) is true for each selection s from the
correspondence Sk then Q is robust to higher-order beliefs.
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 4 and Proposition 8. ·
Our next example shows that either of the inclusions in Proposition 8 may be strict. Hence,
(i) some rationalizable strategies may not be in A°, showing the distinction between the re-
sults of Brandenburger and Dekel and ours, and (ii) A? may include some weakly dominated
strategies, distinguishing our result from the characterization of Brandenburger and Keisler
(2000).
Notation 3 For any E 0, write tK (0) for the type of a player i who is certain that it is
common knowledge that = .
Example 3 Take N = 1, 2}, = (00, 01), and let the action spaces and the payoff functions
for each 0 be given by
ao a1
a° 0,0 0,0
a1 0,0 1,1
(Note that 0 is not payoff relevant.) Define s* by
a if ti = tCK (00);
a1 otherwise.
Clearly, for each k > 1, we have Wik [ti] = al1 and Si [ti] -= (a,al for each ti, while
Aik [s*; t CK ( )] = {a°,a l }, and A [s*; tC K (0l) = {al}.
Proposition 8 yields a characterization whenever the payoffs are generic in the following
(standard) sense.
Definition 1 We say that the payoffs are generic at 0 iff there do not exist i, non-zero
ca E RA , and distinct ai, a, ai, and a' i such that (i) ui (, a, a-i) ui (, ai, a-i) or (ii)
Zai Oa (ai) ui (0, a, a_i) = Eai oe (ai) ui (0, ai, a'i) = 0.
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When the payoffs are generic at 0 and it is common knowledge that 0 = 0, then any action
that is not strictly dominated will be a strict best reply against some belief (at each round),
and hence the two elimination processes will be equivalent. In that case, Propositions 8 and 9
yield the following characterizations.
Corollary 3 For any finite-action game and any equilibrium s* with full range, if the payoffs
are generic at some 0, then for each i and k,
A~ [s*, t ()] = S [tCK ()]
Corollary 4 Consider any 0 with generic payoffs. Any prediction Q of the complete-information
model T = {tCK (0)} with respect to any set of equilibria S* is robust to higher-order beliefs if
and only if Q is true for each action a G Sk [tCK ()].
That is, in generic finite-action games, a researcher's predictions based on finite orders
of players' beliefs and an arbitrary set of equilibria with full range will be identical to the
predictions that follow from rationalizability. This characterization will now be generalized to
another widely-used class of games.
2.5 Nice games
We will now consider a class of "nice" games (Moulin (1984)), which are widely used in economic
theory, such as imperfect competition, spatial competition, provision of public goods, theory of
the firm, etc. We will show that Ak [s*, ti] = Sik [ti] for each k whenever equilibrium s* has full
range.
Definition 2 A game is said to be nice iff for each i, Ai = [0, 1] and ui (, ai, a_i) is continuous
in a = (ai, a_:) and strictly concave in ai.
We use the strict concavity assumption to make sure that a player's utility function for any
fixed strategy profile of the others is always single-peaked in his own action. (Single-peakedness
is not preserved in presence of uncertainty.) We use the continuity assumption to make sure
that a player's strategy best response is continuous with respect to the other players' strategies.
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For the complete information types, our results in this section will be true under the weaker
condition that u (0, , a_i) is single-peaked with a maximand that is continuous in a_i. Now,
since our players always have unique best reply, our elimination processes will be equivalent,
yielding the functional equation
W = S. (2.5)
Moreover, our next lemma ensures that, despite our uncountable action spaces, we only need to
consider countably many actions for types with countable supports, allowing us to circumvent
the measurability issue discussed in Remark 2.
Lemma 5 For any nice game, for any i, ti, k, and any ai E Sik [ti], there exists -i E Sk 1
such that
BR (r (.ti, _i)) = {ai}.
Together with (2.5), Lemma 5 gives us our main result for this section.
Proposition 10 For any nice game, let S* be any set of equilibria s*, each with full range.
Let also e x T be a countable subset of e x T such that for each ii E Ti, suppzi'i C x T-i.
Then, for any k E N, i E N, and i E Ti,
Sf [ti] = Ai [s*, t];
in particular,
s? [ti] = A [, ii]·
Moreover, if ' is closed at order k, then a prediction Q of T with respect to S* is robust to
higher-order beliefs if and only if Q (s) is true for each selection from Skl.
Proof. For any ai E Sik [i] = Wik [i], by Lemma 5, there exists s-i E Sk-1 = Wk-il such
that ai is a strict best reply against 7r (ti, s_i). Since qi. has countable support, P (.ftI, si),
the probability distribution induced by zji and s-i on x L x A_i, has a countable support:
suppP (Ii, (_i) = { 0, , _i (, 1, h)) (0, 1, h) E suppti-}.
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Hence our proof of Proposition 8 applies. That is, there exists ti E Ti (not necessarily in Ti)
such that s* (ti) = ai and t = tiT for each m < k, yielding the equality above. The last
statement in the proposition follows from this inequality by Lemma 4. ·
2.6 Extensions
For ease of exposition, we have so far focused on pure strategy equilibria with full range. In
this section, we will extend our results for mixed strategy equilibria and beyond the full-range
assumption.
2.6.1 Mixed Strategies
Since all equilibria in nice games are in pure strategies, we will focus on the countable-action
games. Using interim formulation, we define a mixed strategy as any measurable function
ai: Ti \ A (Ai). A mixed strategy profile a* is Bayesian Nash equilibrium iff suppa* (ti) C
BRi (r (ti, a*i)) for each i and ti. Writing Ti* = {til IsuppuI* (ti) = 1} for the set of types
who play pure strategies, we define a mapping s : Ti* - Ai by suppa (ti) = {s (ti)}.
We then use this "pure part of"' a* to extend our previous definitions and results to mixed
strategies. We say that a* has full range iff sO* (TU*) = A and set
Ai [a*; ti] 8= { (i) Iti E Tiotin = tVmm < 
the set of all actions that are played with probability 1 under a* by some type ti whose first k
orders of beliefs are identical to those of ti. Clearly, every equilibrium has full range under the
hypothesis of Lemma 3, i.e., when E is sufficiently rich.
Proposition 11 For any countable-action game, any (possibly mixed strategy) equilibrium a*
with full range, any k < oo, i E N, and any ti,
Wik [ti] C Ai [a*, ti] C Si [ti] .
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 8, insert s* everywhere s* appears, and restrict the
range of and the domain of y to E3 x T'a. Notice that, by (2.4), ti E Ti. ·
60
That is, if a* has full range (e.g., if 0 is sufficiently rich) and we know only the first k
orders of a player's beliefs, then for any ai E Wik [ti], we cannot rule out that ai is played with
probability 1 according to oa*. For k > 1, the full-range assumption can replaced by the weaker
assumption that Ai Uti suppa* (ti).
2.6.2 Without full range
Our full range assumption allowed us to consider large changes in higher-order beliefs. A
researcher may be certain that it is common knowledge that the set of parameters are restricted
to a small subset, or equivalently, the equilibrium considered may not vary much as the beliefs
about the underlying uncertainty change. We will now present an extension of our main result
to such cases.
Local Rationalizability For any B1 x ... x B C A, define sets Sk [B; ti], i E N, k E N,
ti E Ti, by setting
S9 [B;ti] = Bi
S [B; ti] = U BRi (r (ti, i)),
'-_iEA (Skl1 [B])
where kl [B] C Mi is the set of all measurable functions f E O x Ti - A_i such that
f (8, t_) E Skl1 [B; t_i] for each t-i. Notice that this is the same procedure as iterated strict
dominance, except that the initial set is restricted to a subset. Unlike iterated strict dominance,
these sets can become larger as k increases. Hence we define the set of locally rationalizable
strategies by
oo00 00
S [B;ti] = n U Sm [B; ti]
k=O m=k
Notice that the set S° [B; ti] may be much larger than B. We define local version of W',
similarly, by setting W ° [B; ti] = Bi,
W [B; ti] = {ai E Ai BRi (i, oi) = {ai} for some _iE \ (Wk-l [B])},i
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and W?7 [B; ti] = F)O Um=k W7i [B; ti]. Notice that we consider all actions in our process,
which is no longer an elimination process.
Proposition 12 For any equilibrium s*, if the game has countable action spaces, then
wk [S* (T) ; ti] C Ak [s*, ti] Sk [s* (T); ti] (Vi, k, ti);
if the game is nice, then with notation of Proposition 10, for any B C s* (T),
Sk [B; ti] C A [*, ti] = Sik [* (T); i] (Vi, k, ti)
The last statement implies that, for nice games, even the slight changes in very higher-
order beliefs will have substantial impact on equilibrium behavior, unless the game is locally
dominance-solvable. There are important games in which a slight failure of common knowledge
assumption in very high orders leads to substantially different outcomes-as in Section 2.8.
2.7 Continuity of Equilibrium
It is well known that equilibrium may be discontinuous with respect to the product topology.
In this section we will introduce our notion of continuity with respect to higher-order beliefs,
which appears much weaker than continuity with respect to the product topology. We will show
that even this weaker continuity property is violated in every equilibrium on a very large set.
2.7.1 Equilibrium in pure strategies
We consider an arbitrary metric d on A. A sequence (am)meN is said to converge to some a E A
iff for each e > 0, there exists k such that d (am, a) < e for each m > k. Given any subset
B C A, we write D (B) = sup {d (a, b) la, b E B} for the diameter of B.
Definition 3 An equilibrium s* is said to be continuous (with respect to product topology) at
t iff for each sequence (t[m])mcN of type profiles
[k [] tk Vk] =t [s* ([m]) s* (t)].
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An equilibrium s* is said to be continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t if ffor each
e > 0, there exists k such that for each t,
[tm = tm Em < k] , d (s* ( s, * (t)) < e.
The latter continuity concept is uniform continuity with respect to the product topology
(on the type space) of discrete topologies on each order of beliefs. Of course, continuity with
respect to discrete topology is much weaker than other topologies. The next lemma presents
some basic facts.
Lemma 6 For any equilibrium s* and for any t, the following are true.
1. If s* is continuous at t, then s* is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t.
2. s* is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t if D (Ak [s*, t]) -- 0 as k - oco.
3. If s* is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t, then A0° [s*, t] = {s* (t)}.
For nice games, Lemma 6.3 and Proposition 10 imply that if an equilibrium s* with full
range is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t, then S°° [t] = {s* (t)}, yielding the
following discontinuity result. (One can obtain a similar result for countable-action games by
replacing S° [t] = {s* (t)} with IW-° [t]lI < 1.)
Proposition 13 For any nice game, every equilibrium s* with full range is discontinuous with
respect to the higher-order beliefs (and the product topology) at each type profile t for which
there are more than one rationalizable action profiles. In particular, if a nice game possesses
an equilibrium s* that is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs or with respect to the
product topology, then the game is dominance solvable.
2.7.2 Mixed-strategy equilibria in finite-action games
Endow the space of mixed action profiles, (A), with an arbitrary metric d. Extend the
definitions of continuity with respect to product topology and higher-order beliefs to mixed-
strategy equilibria a* by replacing s* with a* in Definition 3.
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Definition 4 A mixed-strategy equilibrium a* is said to be weakly continuous with respect to
higher-order b:eliefs at t iff there exists k such that for each t,
[tm = tm Vm < k] => supp (a* (t)) n supp (a* (t)) 0.
Now, continuity in product topology implies continuity with respect to higher-order beliefs.
For finite-action games, the latter in turn implies weak continuity with respect to higher-order
beliefs, as we show in the Appendix (see Lemma 9). There we also show that strong and
weak continuity of a* at t with respect to higher-order beliefs imply that Am [a*, t] I < 1 and
A' [a*, t] C supp(a* (t)), respectively. This yields the following result.
Proposition 14 For any finite-action game and any equilibrium a* with full range, W00 [t] I<
1 whenever (i) a* is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t, or (ii) a* is weakly
continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t and a* (t) is pure.
Proof. Either of the conditions (i) and (ii) implies that IA00 [a*, t] < 1 (see Lemma 9).
Hence, by Proposition 11, IW' [t] < IA00 [a*, t] < 1. 
That is, for sufficiently rich 9, every equilibrium is discontinuous with respect to higher-
order beliefs (and the product topology) at each type profile for which two or more action
profiles survive iterated elimination of strategies that cannot be a strict best reply. These type
profiles include the generic instances of complete-information without dominance solvability.
At each such type profile, even the weakest continuity property fails if the equilibrium actions
are pure.
Example 4 Consider the coordinated attack game with payoff matrix
Attack No Attack
Attack 1,1 -2, 0
No Attack 0,-2 0,0
where there are two pure strategy equilibria: the efficient equilibrium (Attack, Attack) and the
risk-dominant equilibrium (No Attack, No Attack). Since each action is a strict best reply, no
action is eliminated in our elimination process. Therefore, Lemma 3 and Proposition 14 imply
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that when we embed the coordinated-attack game in a rich type space as a type profile, every
equilibrium must be discontinuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at that type profile.
Rubinstein's (1989) electronic-mail game presents a type space in which any equilibrium
that selects the efficient equilibrium in the coordinated-attack game must be discontinuous
with respect to higher-order uncertainty. In that example there is also a continuous equilibrium,
which selects the risk-dominant action profile for each type profile. Our example shows that
the latter continuous equilibrium is an artifact of the small type space utilized, and in fact
in a rich type space, no equilibrium could have been robust against higher-order beliefs, and
thus every equilibrium theory would have been sensitive to the assumptions about higher-order
uncertainty, strengthening Rubinstein's position.
Following Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), the global games literature investigates the
equilibria in nearby type profiles that are generated by a model that is closed at the first order.
At these type profiles, the game is dominant solvable, and the resulting equilibrium action profile
converges to the risk-dominant equilibrium as these type profiles approach the coordinated-
attack game. In this way, they select the risk-dominant equilibrium. Our result uncovers a
difficulty in this methodology: every equilibrium must be discontinuous at the limiting type
profile, and an equilibrium selection argument based on continuity is problematic-as there
is another path that we could have taken the limit in which we would have selected the other
equilibrium. This is despite the fact that the equilibrium outcome is robust against higher-order
beliefs in these nearby type profiles themselves.
On a positive note, Kajii and Morris (1997) show that the risk-dominant equilibrium is
robust to incomplete information under common prior assumption. That is, if the common prior
puts sufficiently high weight on the original game, then the incomplete information game has an
equilibrium in which the risk-dominant equilibrium is played with high probability according
to the common prior. Similar positive results are obtained by others, such as Ui (2001), Morris
and Ui (2003). This suggests that, when there is a common prior, it may put low probability
on the paths that converge to other equilibria. (The relationship between existence of nearby
equilibria and existence of converging path for a fixed equilibrium is unknown.)
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2.8 Application: Cournot Oligopoly
In a linear Cournot duopoly, the game is dominance-solvable, and hence Proposition 8 implies
that higher-order beliefs have negligible impact on equilibrium. (This has also been shown
by Weinstein and Yildiz (2003) and is also implied by a result of Nyarko (1996).) On the
other hand, in a linear Cournot oligopoly with three or more firms, any production level that
is less than or equal to the monopoly production is rationalizable, and hence Proposition 10
implies that a researcher cannot rule out any such output level for a firm no matter how many
orders of beliefs he specifies. We will now show a more disturbing fact. Focusing complete-
information types, tCK (0), for fairly general oligopoly models we will show that when there are
sufficiently many firms, any such outcome will be in Si [B; tCK (0)] for every neighborhood B
of s* (tCK (0)). Therefore, by Proposition 12, even a slight doubt about the model in very high
orders will lead a researcher to fail to rule out any outcome that is less than monopoly outcome
as a firm's equilibrium output.
General Cournot Model Consider n firms with identical constant marginal cost c > 0.
Simultaneously, each firm i produces q at cost qic and sell its output at price P (Q; 0) where
Q = i qi is the total supply. For some fixed 0, we assume that O is a closed interval with
E 6O {0}. We also assume that P (0;0) > 0, P(;0) is strictly decreasing when it is
positive, and limQ,,oo P (Q; 0) = 0. Therefore, there exists a unique Q such that
P (; 0) =c.
(In order to have a nice game, we can impose an upper bound for q, larger than Q, without
affecting the equilibria.) We assume that, on [0, Q], P ('; 0) is continuously twice-differentiable
and
P' + QP" < .
It is well known that, under the assumptions of the model, (i) the profit function, u (q, Q; 0) =
q (P (q + Q) -- c), is strictly concave in own output q; (ii) the unique best response q* (Q-i) to
others' aggregate production Q-i is strictly decreasing on [0, Q] with slope bounded away from
0 (i.e., aq*/Q_-i < A for some A < 0); (iii) equilibrium outcome at tCK (0), s* (tCK (0)), is
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unique and symmetric (Okuguchi and Suzumura (1971)).
Lemma 7 In the general Cournot model, for any equilibrium s*, there exists n < oo such that
for any n > fi and any B = [s* (t CK (b))) -e,s* (t CK (0)) + e]n C A with e > O, we have
S? [B; tCK (0)] = [0,qM] (Vi N),
where qM is the monopoly output under P (.; 0).
Proof. Let n be any integer greater than 1 + 1/ AX, where A is as in (ii). Take any n > n.
By (iii), B = [qO, q]n for some qO, qO with qO < qo. By (ii), for any k > 0, Sk [B;tCK (0)] =
[qk, qk]n, where
qk = q* ((n - 1)qk-1) and qk = q* ((n- 1)qk-1).
Define Qk = (n - 1) qk, k (n- 1) qk, and Q* = (n - 1) q*, so that
k= Q* (Qk-1) and Qk = Q* (Qk-1)
Since (n - 1) A < 1, the slope of Q* is strictly less than -1. Hence Qk decreases with k and
becomes 0 at some finite k, and Qk increases with k and takes value Q* (0) = (n - 1) qM at k+1.
That is, Sk [B; tCK (0)] = [0, qM]fl for each k > k. Therefore, S °° [B; tCK ()] = [0, qM]n . ·
Together with Proposition 12, this lemma yields the following.
Proposition 15 In the general Cournot model, assume that 0 = [ - e, 0 + e] for arbitrarily
small e > 0, and that the best-response function q* (Q-i; 0) is a continuous and strictly increas-
ing function of 0 at (Q-i, 0) where Q-i = (n - 1) sj (tCK (0)) is the others' aggregate output
in equilibrium. Then,
Ai [s, tCK (0)] = [0, qM] (Vi E N),
where qM is ihe monopoly output under P (; 0).
Proof. By (i) above, we have a nice game. By the hypothesis, there exists B C s* (T) as
in Lemma 7. Hence, Lemma 7 and Proposition 12 imply
[0, qM ] = S? [3; tIK (0)] C Ai [S* tiK (0)] C [0, qM],
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yielding the desired equality. ·
In Proposition 15, the assumption that q* (Q-i; 8) is responsive to guarantees that 
is a payoff-relevant parameter. Our proposition suggests that, with sufficiently many firms,
any equilibrium prediction that is not implied by strict dominance will be invalid whenever
we slightly deviate from the idealized complete information model. To see this, consider the
confident researcher and his slightly skeptical friend in the Introduction. The former is confident
that it is common knowledge that 0 = 0, while the latter is only willing to concede that it is
common knowledge that Io - 01 < E and agrees with the kth-order mutual knowledge of 0 = 0.
He is an arbitrarily generous skeptic; he is willing to concede the above for arbitrarily small
E > 0 and arbitrarily large finite k. Our proposition states that the skeptic nonetheless cannot
rule out any output level that is not strictly dominated.
2.9 Literature Review
There is a sizeable literature that investigates the impact of higher-order beliefs in equilibrium.
A branch of this literature investigates the robustness of some central predictions in economic
theory. In mechanism design, all the surplus can be extracted from players in generic traditional
type spaces (Cremer and Mclean (1988)). Neeman (2004) shows that this is not true when
we introduce second-order uncertainty. In fact, this property generically fails within the set of
common priors on the universal type space, as Heifetz and Neeman (2003) shows. In bargaining
between a seller and a buyer with privately known valuation, the trade occurs immediately, as
conjectured by Coase. Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2002) show that, when the buyer does not know
whether the seller knows buyer's valuation, there will be delay in all equilibria that satisfy a
regularity condition.
In a more abstract level, under a stability condition, Nyarko (1996) shows that equilibrium
is continuous on universal type space. In another paper (Weinstein and Yildiz (2003)), we have
shown that a similar stability condition is sufficient for the maximum impact of higher-order
beliefs to diminish exponentially. In a nice game, these stability conditions imply that the
game is dominance solvable, which is shown in this paper to be a necessary condition for such
a diminishing impact.
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Morris (2002) analyzes the topology required for uniform continuity of equilibrium over a
class of games in which the players try to predict the other players' hierarchy of beliefs. He shows
that this topology is equivalent to the topology of uniform convergence and that traditional
type spaces are non-generic with respect to the latter topology. By requiring uniform continuity,
Morris (2002) focuses on worst-case scenarios, while we analyze the continuity of equilibrium
within a fixed. game. In fact, for that class of payoff functions the game is dominance-solvable,
and therefore every equilibrium must be continuous.
Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2004) characterize the topology that is required for upper-
and lower-semicontinuity of rationalizability for general spaces, using again the notion of uni-
form continuity. While the topology for the upper-semicontinuity is the usual product topology,
the topology for the lower-semicontinuity needs to be finer, yet the finite type-spaces are dense
in the latter topology. The latter finding answers a question that has been open since Mertens
and Zamir (1985) for rationalizability, showing that rationalizable strategies can be approxi-
mated using finite type spaces. This is consistent with our result because every equilibrium may
be highly discontinuous while the rationalizability correspondence is smooth. One can easily
construct simple examples in which the rationalizability correspondence is constant, while every
equilibrium must be discontinuous at each type. 6
Conceptually, our main result is related to the epistemic literature on rationalizability and
equilibrium as follows: An important category of predictions are that of universal equilibrium
predictions, which state that a proposition is true for all equilibria. We can use the results
of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) to analyze the robustness of these predictions: once one
allows for subjectivity in players' priors, then a universal equilibrium prediction will continue
to hold only if it is also a universal prediction of iterated elimination of never-a-weak-best-
reply strategies. Clearly, many existing results in economics fall into another category: local
predictions. A researcher focuses on one equilibrium or a small class of equilibria and makes
statements that are true for these equilibria. Our result concerns robustness of any such local
prediction with respect to the assumptions on higher-order beliefs. It shows that once one
6 For example, consider a complete information game in which every strategy is a unique best reply to a belief,
but there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Scrambling the labels of strategies, construct new states, so that for
each strategy profile there is a state at which the strategy profile is the unique Nash equilibrium. Consider
the universal type space on these states. Now, W - S° ° = A is constant, but every equilibrium must be
discontinuous at each type by Proposition 14.
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allows for uncertainty about higher-order beliefs, then any local (or universal) equilibrium
prediction must also be a universal prediction of iterated elimination of never-a-strict-best-
reply strategies. We cover all local and universal predictions, generated by arbitrary equilibrium
selection criteria. Hence, our lower bound becomes weak in certain cases. For example, when
iterative admissibility has strong predictive power, our lower bound becomes weak, for it has
to hold for refinements based on iterative admissibility, which is not sensitive to higher-order
beliefs.
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) explicitly link restrictions on the first-order beliefs (about
both underlying uncertainty and the strategies) to the equilibrium outcomes via their notion of
A-rationalizability. For sequential games, they obtain strong positive results for equilibria that
incorporate forward induction reasoning (see also Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Feinberg
(2002)). Their results suggest that, when A-rationalizability has strong predictive power, if an
equilibrium satisfies the restriction A, then its predictions may be robust to the assumptions
about higher-order beliefs.
Although our goals are different, we can, to some extent, use the methodology of Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003) in our problem. Using this methodology, in cases with multiple A-
rationalizable strategies, one may be able to construct an equilibrium that is sensitive to higher-
order beliefs (on some type space).7 This stops short of our main results, which show that
all equilibria are sensitive to higher-order beliefs whenever two or more actions survive the
elimination process. This difference is especially important because, in response to the existence
of sensitive equilibria, researchers typically invoke a refinement to assume them away. For
7In their model, a player i has a "payoff type" Oi and an epistemic type e, describing his beliefs about
strategic uncertainty. For a fixed k, we can take i = (t,... t), representing the first k orders of his beliefs
about fundamentals. They show that there exists a model with types of the form (Oi,ei), in which each A-
rationalizable action ai (i) is played by some type (,ej) in equilibrium s*. For each type (,ei), write 7,)
for the belief hierarchy of type (i, e) about fundamentals. Suppose that this model happens to be such that
(Oi,ei) (Oi,ei) = 5(i.ei) $ 7(0i,ei) (2.6)
Now represent the types with their belief hierarchies. By (2.6), there is a well-defined equilibrium s on this type
space, and each A-rationalizable action ai (i) is played by some type T(,,,,), whose first k orders of beliefs is
i = (t,... t). The main difficulty here is to obtain (2.6), as we started with an epistemic type space, describing
players' uncertainty about strategies. Battigalli and Siniscalchi have shown that, for generic cases, one can select
a type space so that distinct types have distinct beliefs about 0-i. This is, however, not enough to show (2.6).
(Also, types of the form 0i = (t, ... t) seem to be non-generic as they contain payoff irrelevant information,
but this is not crucial for their result.)
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example, the discontinuous equilibrium in electronic mail game is assumed away by focusing on
the risk-dominant equilibrium in the global games literature. We show that this is not possible.
This approach would also have other limitations. First, since the A-rationalizable sets depend
on the restriction A, we do not know the size of these sets, and we would not know when we
can construct such sensitive equilibria. (One may not be able to construct such an equilibrium,
even when the A-rationalizable set is large.) In contrast, for generic games, we characterize the
robust predictions using usual rationalizability. Second, one cannot obtain our discontinuity
results using this approach, for the equilibria constructed for different orders k may correspond
to different equilibria in universal type space.
Our result has counterparts in sophisticated and Bayesian learning models: the learning of
sophisticated agents leads to equilibrium if and only if the game is dominance solvable (Milgrom
and Roberts (1991)), and in a specific model, any sequence of rationalizable action profiles can be
a sample path in Bayesian learning (Nyarko (1996)). Universal type space allows heterogeneous
priors. In such environments, it is also difficult to interpret equilibrium as an outcome of a
non-sophisticated (myopic) learning process (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004)).
2.10 Conclusion
It is a common practice in economics to close the model after specifying only the first or
second order beliefs, using a (mostly implicit) common knowledge assumption. In this paper,
we have investigated the role of this assumption in predictions according to an arbitrary fixed
equilibrium. Finding strong lower and upper bounds for the variations with respect to this
assumption, we have shown that it is this casually made common knowledge assumption that
drives any prediction that we could not have made already by iteratively eliminating strategies
that can never be strict best reply. In games like Cournot oligopoly, this implies that no
interesting conclusions could have been reached without making a precise common knowledge
assumption. Therefore, it is essential for assuring the reliability of theories to pay special care
to the closing assumption and justify it at least as much as the other assumptions.
When there are two or more actions that survive our elimination process, there is an inherent
unpredictability which cannot be avoided without making an assumption on infinitely many
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orders of beliefs, as all of these actions are played with probability 1 by some types whose
finite-order beliefs agree for arbitrarily high orders. In that case, equilibrium is necessarily
discontinuous with respect to higher-order beliefs and in product topology. Moreover, when
there are no ties, there is a one-to-one relationship between this sensitivity to higher-order
beliefs and sensitivity to higher-order assumptions about players' rationality. It then becomes
very difficult in analyzing these situations to justify the common knowledge of rationality as a
good approximating assumption.
2.11 Proofs and further results
Proof of Lemma 3. Take any i and any ai. Take any y E A (T-i) with countable support,
and let = yo (* i) - 1 E A (Ai). Let v be as in the hypothesis. Define t i as the type such that
nti = v x . Notice that 7r (.Iti, s*i) = ntio -1 = (v x y) O -1 = I x (y o (s* i)-1) = v x.
Hence, s* (ti) = BRI (7r (.jti, s )) = BRi (v x ) = ai. 
Proof of Lemma 5. It follows from the following lemma. 
Lemma 8 For any nice game and for any i, ti, k, the following are true.
1. Sik [ti] =: [ak, ak] for some aik, ai E Ai, which depend on ti.
2. For each a E Sik [ti], there exists -i E Sak7 1 such that
BR (r (fti, i)) = {ak}.
Proof. We will use induction on k. For k = 0, part 1 is true by definition. Assume that
part 1 is true for some k - 1, i.e., S-1 [tj] is a closed interval in Aj = [0, 1] for each j. This
implies that 'kT1 is a closed, convex metric space (with product topology). 8 Moreover, by the
Maximum Theorem, BR (r (.Iti, s_i)) is an upper-semi-continuous function of si. But by the
strict concavity assumption, BR (r (.ti, s_i)) is singleton, and hence the function /3i (; ti) that
8 Proof: Firstly, I(,tj,j) Sjk-l [tj] is a compact space by Tychonoff's theorem. But the space of all measurable
functions f OE x T-i - RN\{i} is closed. Hence, the intersection of these two spaces, namely Sk 1 , is compact.
Convexity of k t1 follows from the facts that measurability is preserved under point-wise multiplication and
addition and that the range is convex.
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maps each s_i E k- 1 to the unique member of BRi (r (.ti, s_i)) is continuous. Since ki7 1 is
compact and convex, this implies that tii (s-1; ) is compact and connected, and hence it is
convex as it is unidimensional. That is, i (sk-1 ti) = [ak, k] for some a_, ai E Ai. We claim
that 3i ( k1; ti) = Sk [ti]. This readily proves part 1. Part 2 follows from the definition of
t/i (Sk;ti).
Towards proving our claim, for each (0, t_i) E Kti and for each s-i E sk-1, define function
Ui (.10, t_i, s_i) by setting Ui (ailO, t_i, s_i) = ui (, ai, si (, t_i)) at each ai. Clearly, Ui is
strictly concave, and for each a-i E A (Sk), the expected payoff of type ti is
Ui (as10, t-i, s-i) dKti (0, ti) da i (s-i ) (2.7)
Now, take any a > . Then, for each (0, t_, si), by definition of ak and strict concavity
of Ui (', t-i, s-i), we have Ui (ail0, t-i, s-i) < Ui (aikl0, L, i, i). It then follows from (2.7)
that aik yields higher expected payoff than ai for each ai E A (sk 1), and thus ai Si [ti].
Similarly, ai . Si [ti] for each ai < ai. ·
Proof of Lemma 6. Part 2 follows from the definitions, and Part 3 follows from Part 2
and the fact that D (A-C [s*, t]) < D (Ak [s*, t]) for each k. To prove Part 1, take any > 0 and
any sequence Ek > 0 that converges to 0. For each k, there exists t [k] such that tm [k] = tm for
each m < k and d (s* (t [k]), s* (t)) > D (Ak [s*, t]) /2 - k SO that
0 < D (Ak [*, t]) < 2d (s* ( [k]) ,s* (t)) + 2 k (2.8)
But, by definition, for each m and each k > m, tm [k] = t, and hence tm [k] t as k -- oo.
Hence, if s* is continuous at t, then as k - oo, s* (t [k]) - s* (t), and thus the right hand side
of (2.8) converges to 0. That is, D (Ak [s*, t]) -+ 0, showing by part 2 that s* is continuous
with respect to higher-order beliefs at t. ·
Lemma 9 For any finite-action game, the following propositions are ordered with logical im-
plication in the following decreasing order.
1. * is continuous with respect to product topology at t.
2. * is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t.
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3. * is weakly continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t.
4. A [r*, t] C supp(c* (t)).
Moreover, (2) implies that IA° [a*, t < 1.
Proof. Since mixed strategies can be considered as pure strategies with values in A (Ai),
by Lemma 6.1, (1) implies (2). To show that (2) implies (3), for each B C A, write EB =
{a E A (A) Isupp () C B}, which is a compact set. Then, for each disjoint B and C, dB,c =
min {d (aB, a) la E EB, a E CC} > 0. Write dmin for the minimum of dB,c among all
disjoint B and C. Clearly, if d (a, a') < dmin, then the supports of a and a' have non-empty
intersection. But (2) implies that there exists k such that whenever t = tm for each m < k,
d (* ( , o* (t)) < din/2, whence supp(a* (t) nsupp(u* (t)) -0-hence (3). (3) implies (4)
because for each a E A' [a*, t] and each k, there exists t such that tm = tm for each m < k and
supp(a* (t) = {a}. The last statement in the lemma also follows from the latter observation
because a* (t) cannot be arbitrarily close to two distinct pure action profiles. ·
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Chapter 3
Price Dispersion and Loss Leaders
3.1 Introduction
There is plentiful empirical evidence of price dispersion, i.e. retail firms charging different
prices for identical goods. One well-known retail strategy which results in price dispersion is
the strategy of cutting prices on one good, known as a "loss leader," in order to attract more
store traffic and increase profits on other goods. Any price dispersion is, of course, contrary to
the unique pure-strategy 1 equilibrium prediction in the setting of Bertrand competition that all
transactions will take place at marginal cost. This theoretical prediction requires the following
assumptions:
1: All firms have identical costs.
2: Consumers have full information, at zero cost, about the prices charged by each firm.
Since the standard argument is given in the context of a market for a single good, when we
are in a situation with multiple goods there is another, sometimes hidden, assumption.
3: Consumers are free to buy different goods at different firms, with zero transportation
costs, so that the markets for different goods are "uncoupled".
A considerable literature has focused on whether price dispersion can result from relaxing
the second assumption, i.e. introducing search costs. In this paper I will keep assumption
'There are mixed-strategy equilibria in which prices are above cost and firms make profits. However (in
the single-good case) all such equilibria involve unbounded prices and are hence eliminated if consumers have a
maximum willingness to pay. In this paper, we will only consider pure-strategy equilibria.
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2, but will drop assumption 3. In particular, I will go to the other extreme and assume
that customers are constrained to purchase their entire bundle of goods from a single firm.
This abstracts the idea that it is time-consuming to do one's shopping at multiple locations,
essentially changing transportation costs from zero to infinity. Intuitively, one might expect
that the resulting "coupled" markets could result in a firm being able to successfully employ a
loss-leader strategy, cutting prices on good A below cost in order to attract customers who will
buy the profitable good B.
In the single-good case, one proves that there is no equilibrium in which a firm makes positive
profits by observing that in this case another firm could "undercut" the profitable firm, charging
a slightly lower price and taking all the profits. This argument still has some validity in the
multi-good case - now "undercutting" means choosing a price vector which is slightly lower for
all goods. The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that when one firm undercuts
another in an effort to steal its profits, it may attract a different clientele which buys goods in
different proportion. If some goods are sold below cost, this may result in losses, confounding
the undercutting argument. We will find, however, that under a relatively innocuous set of
assumptions it is guaranteed that at least one firm can increase its profits by undercutting
another. Our main assumption is that each consumer has inelastic demand (i.e. demands a
fixed bundle).. We also need a genericity assumption on the distribution of demand vectors
that allows us to avoid the technical issue of ties in consumers' firm selection. Our genericity
assumption also lets us avoid a degenerate case in which two goods are always bought in a fixed
proportion, which would allow one price to be raised and the other decreased with no impact
on the decisions of any consumers. Under our assumptions, we will find that in equilibrium no
one makes any profits, and at least two firms charge exactly marginal cost for all goods, just as
in the case of one-good Bertrand competition.
Most of the literature on this topic assumes either bounded rationality, or limited infor-
mation and search costs. This begs the question of why we want to consider a fully rational
model. I feel that it is an important first step to see whether and to what extent a fully rational,
complete-information model can explain this phenomenon before proceeding to behavioral and
informational considerations. Here, we are able to prove a non-trivial result that loss leaders
and price dispersion cannot result merely from linking markets through high transportation
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costs. Therefore the observed phenomenon of price dispersion must be explained by some
factor other than the mere coupling of markets for different goods, justifying exploration of the
role of limited rationality and information.
3.2 Literature Review
Many models have been introduced in which consumers have limited information about prices,
whether search costs are introduced explicitly or information is simply limited more directly.
Lal and Matutes (1994) analyze a model with advertising, in which consumers must decide
where to shop knowing only the prices of goods which the stores choose to advertise, and
only observe the remaining prices once at the store. The consumers have rational expectations
and therefore anticipate that unadvertised goods will be overpriced; nevertheless, in equilibrium
both stores do employ a loss-leader strategy, advertising a particular good which is priced below
cost. More recently, Spiegler (2005) analyzes a model without rational expectations. In this
case, consumers randomly observe one price from each store and choose the store for which that
one price provides the highest consumer surplus. This boundedly rational choice procedure,
called S(1), was introduced by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). Spiegler finds that firms make
positive profits in equilibrium. Also, the variance in prices increases as the number of firms
increases, contrary to the usual intuition about competition. This is essentially because with
a very large number of firms, the best way to get attention from S(1) consumers is to have a
small number of goods with an extremely low price. In fact, if the model did not include a
hard lower bound on prices, the price of the loss leaders would become arbitrarily negative as
the number of firms grew. An alternative model of limited search is analyzed by Chen, Iyer
and Pazgal (2005) who assume that consumers have limited memories for prices. In particular,
the consumers divide the set of possible prices into finitely many ranges and only remember
which range a price is in. They find that this limited memory enables firms to extract a greater
surplus.
On the empirical side, Walters and MacKenzie (1988) find that although the loss-leader
strategy is certainly commonly used, it has no clear effect on store traffic or profits on other
goods. This can potentially be explained by the Lal and Matutes model in which two firms
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simultaneously use the same good as a loss leader. Sorensen (2001) looks at price dispersion in
the retail market for prescription drugs. He fits the data to a model of costly search and indeed
finds evidence that dispersion is an outcome of imperfect search. In particular, prices are less
dispersed when there is more incentive to search, as with medications bought repeatedly for
chronic conditions, and more dispersed when there is less incentive to search, as with consumers
who are fully insured.
The role of this paper is to establish that price dispersion cannot occur in a world with full
information, even with high transportation costs which limit the consumer to one firm. This
baseline result makes it clear that models such as those above which have limited information
or rationality as well as transportation costs are necessary to understand price dispersion.
3.3 Model
We have K identical firms, each of which sells N goods, with constant marginal cost c for the
ith good. There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1, with each consumer having inelastic
demand, so that each individual's demand is characterized by a vector in RN, specifying the
quantity he purchases of each good. The distribution of demands is described by a probability
distribution P on RN. We assume that P assigns zero mass to any hyperplane in RN. The
consumers, who are only able to shop at one firm, select the firm which minimizes their cost
(choosing randomly in case of ties.) A profile (pl, ..., PK) of price vectors is an equilibrium if
no firm could increase profits by changing prices (consumers then adjusting their firm choice.)
As mentioned in the introduction, we will only consider pure-strategy equilibria.
We are interested in whether there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which firms earn
positive profits. Note that if N = 1 we are in the case of standard Bertrand competition,
and the only equilibrium outcome is for all firms to make zero profits, with at least two firms
charging exactly marginal cost.
A few words are in order on the assumption that hyperplanes have zero mass, which I refer
to as a genericity assumption. This terminology is warranted because any distribution on RN
is arbitrarily close to distributions which satisfy the assumption, in the following sense: if X
is any random variable on RIN, and Y is a random variable distributed independently u[-a, c]
81
on each coordinate, X + Y satisfies the assumption, for arbitrarily small . Also note that this
assumption is clearly necessary to exclude price dispersion. In particular, if two goods were
always demanded in a fixed ratio, firms could always increase one price and decrease the other
without any effect on equilibrium.
3.4 Main Result
In this section we will prove that under the assumptions given above, all firms will make
zero profits in any equilibrium. We start with a lemma, which assures using our genericity
assumption on the distribution of demands that ties in consumers' firm selection will not be an
issue for us.
Lemma 10 Assuming all firms have distinct price vectors, the mass of consumers who prefer
more than one firm equally is zero.
Proof. Take any pair of firms i and j. The set of demands for which firms i and j will be
preferred equally is {x E RN : pi x X = pj · x). This is a hyperplane and so by assumption its
mass is zero. ·
We now proceed to the main result.
Proposition 16 In any equilibrium, all firms make zero profits.
Proof. First note that no firm can make negative profits in equilibrium, because it can
always assure itself of non-negative profits by charging at or above cost for all goods. Now
suppose we have an equilibrium (P1, ..-, PK). We can assume without loss of generality that
all costs are zero, since we can replace each pi by pi - c and let costs be zero without af-
fecting the profits or equilibrium conditions. Let Si = {x E RN: Pi ' x < pj x, Vj f i} be
the set of consumer demands for which firm i is preferred to all other firms, and also let
Sij = {x E RN : pi x < p j x· < Pk x, Vk i, j}be the set of demands for which i is pre-
ferred and j is second-best. Each firm's profits are given by 7ri = f i x dP(x). Assume at
least one r i > 0. Define 1 as the vector (1,..., 1) RN and define UC(i, j, ) as the profit that
firm i would make if it undercut firm j by switching to price vector pj Ee · 1. As discussed
in the introduction, it is not automatically profitable to undercut a profitable firm. When firm
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i undercuts firm j it does not only attract consumers from the set Sj, which is known to be
profitable, but also those from the set Si,j, because the price vector pi is no longer available.
We will be able to show, however, that we are not at equilibrium by showing that for some
triple (i, j,e) UC(i, j, ) > i.
We will first consider the case in which some two firms i and j offer identical price vectors.
If firms i and j make positive profit, either one could double its profits by decreasing prices
slightly and attracting all consumers who go to these two firms (the argument also applies if
there is a tie among more than two firms.) If firms i and j make zero profits and some other
firm k makes positive profits, it will certainly be profitable for firm i to undercut firm k - since
the price vector pi is still available from firm j, firm i will only attract consumers from the set
Sk and no others, so the deviation will be profitable.
Henceforth we assume all price vectors are distinct, so that Lemma 1 applies. Let S (i, j, e)
be the subset of demand space for which firm i is chosen after it switches to price vector
pj - 1. Firm i will now be selected by all consumers who previously chose firm j. It
will also be chosen by those who previously chose firm i but liked firm j second best, because
firm i's old price vector is no longer available to them. Therefore, Sj U Si,j C S (i, j,).
Let Ai,j,e = S (i, j,) - (Sj U Si,j). We will now show that (Ai,j,e) -+ 0 as - 0. Any
member of Ai,j,e prefers some firm k i to firm j. By Lemma 1, this preference is strict
except on a set of measure zero. When the preference is strict, Pk will still be preferred to pj
-e 1 for small enough , proving that Ai,j,e - 0, which implies the claim. This implies that
UC(i, j, ) --, sjuij pj . x dP(x) as e -- 0.
Assume without loss of generality that firm makes the smallest profit in our equilibrium.
It will suffice to show that for some j, fsjus, pj PJ x dP(x) > 7r1, for then there will exist an 
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for which UC(1,j, Ej > 71r. Observe that
/=2 .s pj, xdP(x) E [ pj. xdP(x) + pj xdP(x)] (1)
j---2j E72 + P1 xdP(x)1Ij=2 j=2 1,
N= E Xi + Pi xdP(x)j=2 S l .j
Nlrj + P xdP(x)j=2 Sj
N
j=1
where the inequality comes from the revealed preference of customers in the set Sij; we
know they pay less at firm 1 than at firm j.
Because there are N - 1 terms in the left-hand sum, the above inequality implies that for
at least one J, sjus,,j pj x dP(x) N-1 > N > r1, where the strict inequality is
implied by at least one rj > 0. Then firm 1 can improve its profit by undercutting firm j. 
The inequality in (1) is precisely the stage of the proof at which we made use of the individ-
ually inelastic: demands. In particular, this assumption implied that since firm 's customers,
in aggregate, pay a non-negative surplus to firm 1, they would continue to pay a non-negative
surplus if firm 1 vanished and they had to patronize their second choice. This is effectively
what happens as we consider the outcome of firm 1 undercutting each of the other firms in turn;
when he undercuts firm j he attracts not only firm j's old customers, but also his old customers
who liked j second best. Our assumptions on demands ensure that on average, across all firms
he might undercut, this does not hurt him.
Proposition 1 leaves open the possibility of an equilibrium in which firms make profits on
some customers but losses on others, but we will now see that this is not possible.
Proposition 17 In any equilibrium, the set of consumers who pay exactly the marginal cost of
their bundle has mass 1.
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Proof. We will show that if this is not the case, then for some , any firm could make
positive profits by switching to price vector c + e · 1. Let S = {x E RN : c x -< pi P x,Vi} be
the set of demands for which the best price available is above the cost of the bundle. Let
S, = {x E R" : (c + 1) x < Pi. x,Vi} be the set of demands for which the prices c+ 1 are
preferred to those currently available. Note that S = U 1 Si.
n
Note that if P(Se) > 0, then any firm can make profits by switching to price vector c + e 1,
because it would attract consumers in S, and all customers are paying above cost. Therefore,
P(Se) = 0. Then by countable additivity, P(S) = P(U= 1Si) < En=lP(S±) = 0. Therefore,
the set of customers who pay at most the cost of their bundle has mass 1. Suppose a non-zero
mass of customers are paying below cost. Then, some firms would have to be suffering losses,
but this cannot happen in equilibrium. ·
Proposition 2 still leaves open the possibility that although all consumers pay the cost of
their bundle, some goods are priced above cost and others below. We will now see that our
genericity assumption excludes this possibility.
Proposition 18 In any equilibrium, at least two firms have all prices equal to cost.
Proof. Note that if pi 5~ c, then the set {x E RIN: C . X = Pi x} is a hyperplane and so
has mass zero by assumption. Therefore, by the previous proposition, we must have Pi = c for
some i. If this were true only for firm i, we could repeat the argument in the previous proposition
to show that firm i could deviate and make profits by choosing an appropriate vector c + e. 1,
so it must hold for at least two firms. ·
Proposition 19 Firms with some prices not equal to cost have no (that is, mass zero) cus-
tomers.
Proof. As argued above, customers who would pay the cost of their bundle at such a firm
have mass zero, so this is implied by Proposition 2. ·
3.5 Conclusions and further directions
We have seen that in the above context, price dispersion cannot occur in a fully rational,
complete-information model. Our model was also restricted to consumers who individually
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have inelastic demand; the question remains open of whether we could get price dispersion
without this restriction. Also, we have not characterized mixed-strategy equilibria of our
model. This seems to be a difficult problem.
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Chapter 4
Two Notes on the Blotto Game
4.1 Introduction
Consider a game in which the two players simultaneously select vectors from [0, 1]N whose
coordinates sum to 1, and are considered to have won a coordinate if they select a higher
number than their opponent in that coordinate. After Laslier and Picard (2002), we call the
game in which a player's payoff is the number of coordinates won minus the number lost the
plurality game. Alternatively, the object could be simply to win a majority of coordinates. This
is called the majority game. This game can be interpreted as a contest between politicians
allocating advertising money among N states in a simplified electoral college system, where
each state is won by the side with greater spending. The classic case N = 3 was first described
by Borel (1921), and equilibria were first given in Borel and Ville (1938). It is often called the
Colonel Blotto game, as it could be interpreted as a model of resource allocation in warfare,
assuming that; even a small advantage in resources allocated to a given battle is enough to win
that battle completely. In the special case that N = 3 and budgets are equal, the majority
game and plurality game coincide because a player can never win in 0 or 3 coordinates.
It is well-known that a mixed strategy given by a distribution on [0, 1]N whose marginal dis-
tribution on each coordinate is Uniform [0, 2 ] will be an equilibrium strategy in the plurality
game. Borel and Ville (1938) found two examples of such distributions for N = 3, one with
'I thank Balazs Szentes and the late Robert Rosenthal for introducing me to the Blotto game and related
unsolved problems.
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support on the inscribed disc in the triangular representation of the simplex and one, called
the Hex equilibrium, with support on the full hexagon {xi, X2, X3 E [0, ] X1 + X2 + X3 1}
which is the set of best responses in both equilibria. We will exhibit an equilibrium strategy
here, with the same marginal distributions, that has one-dimensional support - in particular,
its support consists of two line segments. The construction generalizes to give a solution for the
N-dimensional plurality game. Specifically, we give a distribution on {x [0, 1]N : EXi = 1}
with support on N - 1 parallel line segments and the desired marginals.
Also, there are no current results on the modification of the majority game in which players
have different total wealth, i.e. one player picks a vector whose sum is 1 while the other picks a
vector whose sum is r. We will provide bounds on the equilibrium payoffs in such a game as a
function of r. We obtain particularly tight bounds when r is close to 1, thereby characterizing
the marginal impact of a small advantage in available resources.
4.2 Recent Literature
Laslier and Picard (2002) apply equilibria of the Blotto game to analyze the redistribution of
goods that results from two-party electoral competition. In particular, they give the Lorenz
curve and determine other measures of the inequality that would result from the distributions
prescribed by the disc equilibrium. Kvassov (2003) analyzes Blotto-style contests with the
modification that players do not necessarily use all their available resources. This approach
would be justified in the many applications in which resources have an alternative use or can
be saved for the next period. Our framework, on the other hand, in which resources must be
spent immediately or lost, would frequently be appropriate in the context of campaign spending
or warfare. Kvassov also allows for asymmetric budgets. Unlike our results on asymmetric
budgets in Section 4, which focus on the majority game, he focuses on a game in which the
objective is to win as many coordinates as possible (plurality game). Clearly this would
be appropriate in auctions or other contexts where each coordinate won has value, while the
majority perspective would usually be appropriate in an electoral context.
The majority game is also relevant in the scenario studied by Szentes and Rosenthal (2003),
a simultaneous auction for three objects (chopsticks) in which the marginal value of acquiring a
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second object is high compared to the first. They are able to completely describe the equilibria
of such auctions, which are closely related to Blotto games. The key difference is that the
lower bidder for each object does not pay, whereas the usual Blotto game is similar to an all-
pay auction. The all-pay condition is a sensible model when resources cannot be recovered, as
in campaign spending or warfare.
4.3 One-Dimensional Equilibrium
In this section, we will exhibit a one-dimensional distribution on the N-dimensional sim-
plex AN = E RN: xi 0, E xi = 1 whose marginal distribution on each coordinate is
Uniform [0, N2] and which is therefore an equilibrium of the plurality game. We can depict
this distribution graphically in the case N = 3 as a uniform distribution on the two line seg-
ments pictured in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts the simplex explicitly as a subset of I 3 ,
while in Figure 2 we have the usual two-dimensional representation which we will use hence-
forth. This is obtained by letting the plane of the page be the plane x1 + x2 + x 3 = 1. Notice
that the distribution of x3 is uniform on each line segment individually. Also, coordinate x1
is distributed U [0, 1] on the left-hand segment in Figure 2 and U [1, 2] on the right-hand seg-
ment, yielding the correct distribution overall. Similarly, coordinate x2 is distributed U [0, 3]
on the right-hand segment and U [, 2] on the left-hand segment. In general, our distribution
will be uniform on N - 1 parallel line segments in the N-dimensional simplex, as described
below.
Proposition 20 Let T = 1+2+... +(N - 1) NN-1) The uniform distribution on the N-1
parallel line segments whose endpoints are given by (k, k + 1, ..., N - 2, 0, ..., k - 1, N - 1) and
(k + 1, k + 2,..., N - 1,1,..., k, 0) for k = 0,1,..., N - 2 gives a distribution on AN whose
marginal distribution on each coordinate is Uniform [0, .
Proof. First notice that the coordinates of each endpoint sum to 1, so that each line
segment is indeed contained in the simplex. Also, the distribution of the last coordinate XN,
which plays a special role, is U [0, N-1] = U [0, 2] on each segment. The distribution of the
first coordinate is U [, k+-l] on the kth segment, yielding the correct overall distribution as k
runs from 0 to N - 2. A similar argument applies to coordinates x2 through XN_1. 
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(1/3, 2/3, 0)
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Figure 4-1:
Notice that we would get a different distribution if we relabelled the coordinates; if we take
the average of the distributions formed by the possible labellings we get a distribution which,
like the classic examples, is symmetric between the coordinates. In the 3-dimensional case this
is a uniform distribution on the six-pointed star pictured in Figure 3.
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(0.1.0) (1/3, 2/3, 0) (2/3, 1/3, 0)
Figure 4-2:
Distributive Implications and the Lorenz Curve
Laslier and Picard (2002) compute the average Lorenz curve that would result if wealth
were distributed as in the disc equilibrium. If we order a division of one unit of wealth among
N individuals so that yi < Y2 < ... < Yn, the Lorenz curve is defined by the partial sums
Ck(y) = 1=lYi. Given the mixed strategy defined above, a straightforward computation shows
that the expected values of these partial sums are lk(N) = -. In the limit, this approximates
an average Lorenz curve of c(t) = t2; that is, the average proportion of total wealth held by
the smallest fraction t of the population is t2. In contrast, for the disc equilibrium Laslier and
Picard find that the corresponding curve is cd(t) = t - sin t, which lies above our curve, so
that there is more inequality in our equilibrium. Indeed, they find that the limit of the Gini
index of inequality (defined as twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal) is 1,
while for us it is 1
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Figure 4-3:
4.4 Asymmetric Budgets
In this section we will analyze the majority game in the case N = 3, with the modification
that player 2 has a total budget of 1 unit but player 1 has a total budget of r. Note that
in the plurality game payoffs are completely determined by the marginal distributions on each
coordinate, because of the additively separable utility functions. This property does not hold
in the majority game except in the special case of equal budgets. In general, this makes it
more difficult to describe equilibria, but we will be able to show some results giving bounds
on the equilibrium payoffs for different values of r. In particular, let w(r) be the equilibrium
probability of winning for player 1. This section will establish some properties of the function
w.
It will be convenient to modify our tie-breaking rule and specify that the player with the
larger budget wins all ties, as suggested by Kvassov (2003). This ensures that payoffs are
weakly lower-semicontinuous, which along with the fact that we have a constant-sum game
with compact action spaces, and discontinuities lie in a lower-dimensional space, allows us
to apply a result of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) to guarantee existence of a mixed-strategy
93
equilibrium.
We note that in two-player zero-sum games, it is appropriate to speak of equilibrium strate-
gies rather than strategy profiles. Indeed, we can define an equilibrium strategy as one which
guarantees that the player receives at least his equilibrium (or maximin) payoff, and any pair of
equilibrium strategies will be an equilibrium in the usual sense. Similarly, we can speak of an
e-equilibrium strategy as one which guarantees that the player comes within of his maximin
payoff.
We observe that changing r to effectively interchanges the roles of the two players, so that
we have the following:
Fact 1: w(>) = - w(r).
Because of this symmetry, we will focus on the case r > 1. We will now specify exactly
how much of an advantage is necessary for player 1 to guarantee victory.
Proposition 21 w(r) = 1 if and only if r > 3
Proof. If r > 3 player 1 can guarantee victory by choosing the vector (3, , ); player 2
cannot win because beating player 1 in two coordinates would require more than 1 unit
of wealth.
Now suppose r < , and let player 2 use the strategy which is uniformly distributed on the
simplex. Take any action of player 1, and assume without loss of generality xl < x2 < x3, so
that xl + x2 1 2 r < 1. Then the region of player 2's action space in which he wins coordinates
1 and 2 is an equilateral triangle of side 1 - Xl - X2 > 1 - 2r, so for fixed r, there is a positive
lower bound on his winning probability proportional to (1 - r)2. ·
We also have the following:
Proposition 22 If r> then w(r) > 2.
Proof. Suppose player 1 uses an equal mixture among the three vectors given by (, , r- 1)
and its permutations. We claim that any vector chosen by player 2 defeats at most one of
these three vectors, so player 1 is guaranteed to win at least two-thirds of the time. Suppose
to the contrary, so that without loss of generality player 2 has a vector (Xl, X2, X3) which wins
against ( , 71 - 1) and (, r - 1, ). In order to win against the first of these vectors we must2 2 2/ 1 II VI UjC13 II IJ V 17r V~V V lC3,
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have X3 > r -- 1 > and in order to win against the second vector we must have x2 > r-1 > ,
implying that xz < 1. Then, we would have to win against both vectors in both the second
and third coordinate, implying x2 and x3 are both greater than ½ which is impossible. 
As our main result in this section, we will determine the marginal impact of a player having a
small advantage in available resources. The general idea is that the equilibrium strategies from
the symmetric case will still approximate equilibrium strategies here. From this argument, we
will get the following result, which gives tight bounds on w(r) when r is close to 1. It will turn
out to be important that the stronger player uses an equilibrium strategy with bounded density.
The Hex equilibrium has density proportional to maxi xi - , which is bounded above. Thus,
the one-dimensional distribution given in the previous section, or the disc equilibrium, which
has unbounded density near the boundary, would be inferior to the Hex strategy when budgets
are slightly asymmetric, in the sense that they do not approximate equilibrium strategy as
closely, giving the weaker player a higher maximum payoff.
Proposition 23 There exists A > 0 such that for all r > 1, 3r-1-A(r-1)2 w(r) < 3t-1.
Proof. Assume that r > 1 and that player 2 employs a strategy which has marginal distri-
bution U [0, 2] on each coordinate. Then for any vector in player 1's choice set {(x1, x2, X3 )
Xl + x2 + 3 = r} his probability of winning in coordinate i is i = min(3xi, 1). Then
P1 + P2 +p3 3r, with equality if xI, 2, 3 < 2( With r > 1, player 1 could win in one,
two, or all three coordinates. Let the probability that he wins in exactly j coordinates be
qj. We can now compute his expected number of coordinates won in two different ways,
as q + 2q2 + 3q3 = Pi + P2 + p3. Thus, the probability that player 1 wins a majority is
q2 + q3 = P -- P2 + P3 - (q + q2 q3) - q3 = PI - 2 + P3 - 1q3 - r - 1. Therefore,
w(r) < r-1.
Now, to get a lower bound on w(r), assume player 1 employs a scaled version of the Hex
strategy which has marginal distribution U [0, r] on each coordinate, and has maximum den-
sity 5. We will seek the action for player 2 that maximizes his winning probability. For
each vector (Y1, Y2, y3) in player 2's choice set, his probability of winning each coordinate i is
pi = min(2 3yi, 1). Since player 2 will always win in 0, 1, or 2 coordinates, a derivation similar
to that above gives that his winning probability is 2 = p1 + P2 + p3 - 1 + so where sj is the
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probability that he wins exactly j coordinates. For a fixed action of player 2, the region in
player 1's action space for which player 2 wins in 0 coordinates will be an equilateral triangle
of side r - 1., as depicted in Figure 4. He will want to choose his action so that this triangle
is in a region of maximal density2 , which is why it is important that the density of player 's
strategy be bounded. We then have that player 2's winning probability satisifies
s2 < pl+P2+p3-1+p-(r-1) 2
3  1+ p--(r- 1)22r 4
Therefore
w(r) I -ax 2 - -- (r- 1 2() 2 2r 4
Now we will use the expansion
= (1-r) 1 (1-r2 + (1- r ) ...
r 1-(1-r)
< 1+(1-r) + ( - r)2
when r > 1. Substituting this into the inequality above, we have
w(r) 2- [1 + (1 - r) + ( - r)2] -p (r - 1)2
= r--(p + )(r -1)2
as desired. ·
In the course of the proof, we also showed
Corollary 5 Fix r > 1 and let E = A(r - 1)2. Any equilibrium strategy of the symmetric game
is an e-equilibrium strategy for the weaker player. The Hex strategy is an e-equilibrium strategy
for the stronger player, while any other equilibrium strategy of the symmetric game with higher
maximum density is not.
2 It may momentarily seem obscure that he wants to maximize his probability of losing all three coordinates.
The key is that his expected number of coordinates won is constant, and winning exactly one coordinate is a
useless waste of resources.
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Figure 4-4: The simplex represents the action space of player 1, who is assumed to have fixed
a mixed strategy. The point represents an action (Y1, Y2, Y3) for player 2. The label in each
region is the number of coordinates player 2 would win if 's action were in that region, so he
is trying to maximize the total mass under player 's strategy of the regions labeled 2. This
turns out to be equivalent to maximizing the mass of the triangle labeled 0.
Our bounds on w(r), which only differ by a second-order term for r close to 1, also yield
the following result.
Corollary 6 w'(1) = 3
Proof. For the right derivative this is immediate. The left derivative follows from a short
derivation using symmetry considerations (i.e. Fact 1). 
97
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The proof of our final proposition suggests that an equilibrium strategy of the standard Blotto
game will be more robust to small asymmetries in players' available resources when the density
of the strategy is bounded above. It is relatively easy to show that the Hex strategy has the
smallest maximum density of any distribution with the appropriate marginals, so that it is
maximally robust from this point of view. The new distribution which we presented, of course,
does not do well under this criterion, since it has one-dimensional support. It does have the
aesthetic advantage of being extremely easy to describe and verify.
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